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Introduction 
 “Sometimes it takes a natural disaster to point out a social disaster.”1 This quote by editor 
Jim Wallis relates Hurricane Katrina to the racial history that has been playing out in New 
Orleans since the foundation of the city. The social disaster he is referring to is the state of the 
poor black population in New Orleans. This is not a history of inequality and oppression that has 
popped up recently. Blacks in New Orleans have been subjected to these conditions since the 
foundation of the city in 1718. The neglectful policies, infrastructure, and attitude of the colonial, 
federal and local governments have turned the majority of the New Orleans’ inhabitants, the 
black population, into second-class citizens. This problem should have disappeared with the 
passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when blacks in the United States were given the equal 
rights that all U.S. citizens could take advantage of and discrimination was theoretically ended. 
Due to the unique situation in the black community which combines violence, environmental 
inequalities, and segregation, they have been unable to escape the discrimination of the old 
south.  
 The idea for this thesis was born out of a trip to New Orleans that I took my sophomore 
year in high school. Two years after Hurricane Katrina had ravaged the city, I went down to do 
service work with Habitat for Humanity building houses in the Ninth Ward and Alexandria, LA 
about an hour north of New Orleans. We were given a tour of the French Quarter and university 
district of town. It was beautiful and lively, exactly how I had pictured New Orleans. The next 
day we were given a tour the Ninth Ward before we started work and the sight of devastation that 
still remained astounding to me.  I did not know how a place, so close to the hustle and bustle of 
Bourbon Street could be so opposite. I could never get the images out of my head of the X’s 
spray painted on houses marking where the National Guard had come through searching for 
bodies. I was very glad to be there helping those in need. These images of utter devastation were 
brought up again when I read An Unnatural Metropolis in a class at Wooster. This gave me more 
background into the history of the Big Easy and the inequities that were present in the city. 
 My Senior Independent Study will show how the black residents of New Orleans were 
placed in the position of being second-class citizens by the governments that controlled the city. 
The black community was disproportionately affected by Katrina. It is important to uncover the 
                                                          
1
 Michael Fletcher. "Katrina Pushes Issues of Race and Poverty at Bush." The Washington Post. September 12, 
2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/11/AR2005091101131.html (accessed 
November 20, 2011); hereafter cited as “Katrina Pushes Issues of Race and Poverty at Bush.” 
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reasons behind the disaster so that it can be prevented in the future. New Orleans has a deep 
history of racial tensions that are rooted in slavery that intensified overtime. The research will 
expose more of the truth behind the inequalities in New Orleans.   
 Craig Colten’s book, An Unnatural Metropolis: Wresting New Orleans from Nature, 
played an instrumental role in constructing the environmental argument in this paper. Colten 
covers a period that starts at the foundation of the city in 1718 and runs through 2005, just before 
Hurricane Katrina. He focuses on the struggles that New Orleans has had to endure in trying to 
control the two large bodies of water that would inundate the land naturally. While his focus is 
on the city itself and the taming of the natural world, he alludes to how the racial demographics 
of the city seem to illuminate the discrepancies between the black and white communities as they 
are affected by the harsh environment. The conclusions that can be drawn from his book are that 
the black citizens of the city are disproportionately harmed by environmental injustices.
2
 
 Following in Colten’s footsteps, there have been numerous articles written about the 
failure of the United States government to properly protect New Orleans from the environment. 
Fischetti, Duffy, and Reiter all talk about the different factors that affected the whole population. 
Paul Reiter’s article is about mosquito-borne diseases, such as yellow fever, and how they are 
affected by climate change. He describes the mechanism behind yellow fever and how New 
Orleans had the perfect conditions in their swamps which made their outbreaks of yellow fever 
so dangerous. His work is put into a racial context when combined with a British Medical 
Journal published in 1879 about one of these outbreaks. It details the medical reports of the 
Sanitary Inspector of the fourth district, Dr. Holt, who explains where the mosquitoes were 
breeding and how the conditions in the poor black areas of New Orleans were creating these 
spawning grounds for the insects.  
John Duffy writes a comparative article on the yellow fever epidemics in New York and 
New Orleans. His article goes into the racial and class dynamics of the disease. Duffy argued that 
yellow fever was so crippling in New Orleans because rich people ignored the fact that it was 
more than just a normal fever and blamed it on the filthy conditions in which the poor were 
living. He described the upper class in New Orleans as much less aware of how the disease was 
spread than New Yorkers and the New Yorkers were able to look past distinctions of class and 
                                                          
2
 Craig Colten,. An Unnatural Metropolis: Wresting New Orleans from Nature. Baton Rogue: Louisiana State 
Unitversity Press, 2005; hereafter cited as An Unnatural Metropolis. 
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race to eradicate yellow fever. This negatively affected the public health of all living in the city. 
Duffy said that it was the apathy of the rich whites in New Orleans that slowed the installation of 
the improved drainage systems.
3
  
Mark Fischetti’s two articles Protecting New Orleans and Stemming the Flood provide a 
modern context as to how the government, local and federal, knew the protective systems built 
around New Orleans were actually detrimental to the environment. In his 2001 article in 
Scientific American, he goes into exactly how the changes made to the landscape to protect the 
city New Orleans have destroyed the natural barrier islands that have been keeping the land safe 
since before the city’s foundation. He also goes through the arguments between localities and the 
federal government about who should pay to make the city a place that will not be damaged by 
impending natural disasters.
4
 This article is important in showing that the government knew that 
protection in the city was inadequate to protect against the strongest storms in New Orleans but 
did nothing to reinforce them. The U.S. government did not want to fund this extremely 
expensive project and the municipal government could not afford it. Coast 2050: Toward a 
Sustainable Coastal Louisiana was a report created in 1998 by the federal, state, and local 
governments that described all the different ways that they could restore the natural storm 
barriers and better protect the city. However, this was never put into effect because of the reasons 
that Fischetti stated, such as lack of funds.  
These sources help to show that those in power believed that the majority black 
population of New Orleans was not deemed worth the government’s money to protect.5 Several 
other claims were made by the local government regarding their knowledge of the 
unpreparedness of the city to evacuate all residents of the city. Articles in The New York Times, 
“If the Big One Were to Hit The Big Easy, The Good Times Could be Over Forever,” and The 
Time Magazine, “The Threatening Storm,” both had quoted from high standing officials in the 
local New Orleans governments saying that those without cars did not have a chance to escape 
the city. These sources highlight that the black communities, which were often the poorest, were 
                                                          
3
 Duffy, John. "Nineteenth Century Public Health in New York and New Orleans: A Comparison." Louisiana 
History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, 1974: 325-337; hereafter cited as “Nineteenth Century 
Public Health in New York and New Orleans.” 
4
 Fischetti, Mark. "Protecting New Orleans." Scientific American, 2006: 64-71; hereafter cited as “Protecting New 
Orleans.” 
5
 Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and the Wetlands Conservation and 
Restoration Authority. Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Costal Louisiana. Baton Rouge: Louisiana Department of 
Natural Resources, 1998; hereafter cited as Coast 2050. 
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being forced to live in the worst conditions, were blamed in the early years for the permeation of 
disease into the general population, and were unprotected by the US government from natural 
disasters. 
 The role of violence in the southern United States to keep blacks in a state of oppression 
played a pivotal role in New Orleans. This violence starts off with its roots in slavery. 
Gwendolyn Hall writes about the colonial governments and how they treated their slave subject 
in her book Africans in Colonial Louisiana. She provides a wide array of information from the 
languages that the slaves spoke to the laws that were put in place to regulate slave ownership. 
The sections of her book that were most helpful talked about the different styles of slavery that 
each colonial government had and how violent they were towards their slaves.
6
 Hall’s book 
helped draw comparisons to the United States style of slavery which was the final type to be 
represented in the city’s history.  
The House of Representatives also documents violence against blacks in their hearings 
about the riots in New Orleans that took place on July 30, 1866. These hearings explored what 
the cause of the riot was and the conditions in the city that set it in motion. The document has 
detailed reports of those who partook in the riots and those leading the Constitutional Convention 
which provoked the riot.
7
 This document is crucial in understanding the feelings of whites in the 
city after the Civil War. Leonard Moore wrote Black Rage in New Orleans which highlights 
incidents of police brutality of New Orleans and black activism in the city from WWII up to 
Hurricane Katrina. Moore makes the argument that police brutality in the United States is a result 
of the increasing black presence and rights given to them. He argues that police brutality in New 
Orleans served as a measure to control the black population from attaining the same inclusion in 
American culture as whites. As a response to police brutality, Moore tells how the black 
community in the city fought back with activism that included non-violent movements like the 
NAACP and more aggressive movements like the Black Panther Party (BPP). The combination 
                                                          
6
 Gwendolyn Midlo Hall. Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Developement of Afro-Creole Culture in the 
Eighteenth Century. Baton Rogue: Louisiana State University Press, 1992; hereafter cited as Africans in Colonial 
Louisiana. 
7
 Representative Thomas Dawes Eliot (MA). “New Orleans Riots” Congressional Record 39: 2 (February 11, 1867) 
H.rp. Available from: LexisNexis® Congressional; Accessed: January 15, 2012; hereafter cited as “New Orleans 
Riots.” 
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of police brutality and the black movements that were working together to combat it and other 
unfair governmental policies led to a very racially charged New Orleans as Moore explains.
8
  
 An important article was printed in the New York Times that interviewed the man who 
was hired to reform the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) in the 1990s, Richard 
Pennington. In interviews with Pennington, the author, Paul Keegan, was truly able to 
understand and portray the situation that the NOPD was in. He wrote about the situations in the 
NOPD that made national news and was able to uncover documentation and reports of many 
other cases of police officers crimes that were committed.
9
 This article helped to form an 
argument against the credibility of the NOPD as law enforcement officials and how this affected 
the black population. 
One of the monographs examined in this thesis is Showdown in Desire by Orissa Arend. 
This book uses interviews with members of the black community, Black Panthers, and whites 
who experienced the police attempting to shutdown the BPP in New Orleans. Without 
provocation, other than knowing the residents were armed, the police, numbering in the 
hundreds, had a shoot out at one of the two BPP headquarters when the police attempted to arrest 
the heavily armed occupants of the building. The second part of the “showdown” included a 
standoff between civilians and the police. Thousands of civilians from New Orleans projects 
came out and impeded the police’s progress when they were attempting to arrest more BPP 
members.
10
 This indicates the importance of civilian organizing against the white power 
structure and the extreme measure the police would go to in order to oppress the black 
population.  
This “showdown” between the police and BPP is also shown with two pictures taken by 
photographers for the Time-Picayune. One is showing the standoff between the project’s 
inhabitants and the police when they are on their way to arrest the BPP members. The 
expressions on the faces of the residents make it clear that the police were not wanted and 
signified support for the Panthers. (See Figure 6.) The other photographer is of a police tank 
                                                          
8
 Leonard N. Moore. Black Rage in New Orleans: Police Brutality and African American Activism from World War 
II to Hurricane Katrina. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010; hereafter cited as Black Rage in New 
Orleans. 
9
 Paul Keegan. "The nes Line: Richard Pennington, the newest chief or police in New Orleans, has to deal with 
organized drug rings, execution-style murderers, bank robbers and rapists. And that's just the cops." The New York 
Times Magazine, 1996: 32; hereafter cited as “The nes Line.” 
10
 Orissa Arend, Showdown in Desire: The Black Panthers Take a Stand in New Orleans. Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 2009; hereafter cited as Showdown in Desire. 
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rolling through the projects on the way to the house where the BPP had their headquarters. (See 
Figure 7.) This picture serves to demonstrate the excessive force the NOPD was willing to go to 
stop this organization from spreading their highly politicized message of “Black Power.”11 
Segregation plays an obvious role defining the injustices that were enacted upon the 
black community to make them second-class citizens. Arnold Hirsch and Joseph Logsdon 
describe the unique blending of races in the early days of New Orleans and how it changed when 
the United States took over control of the former French and Spanish colony. Their book, Creole 
New Orleans: Race and Americanization, explains the roles white Americans who migrated to 
New Orleans after the Louisiana Purchase played in changing how blacks were treated in the 
city. They talk about how free blacks went from being valued for their skilled labor under 
European control to being pushed into similar jobs that they were required to do as slaves under 
the United States racist power structure.
12
 This source chronicles the new standard that the 
United States set for race relations in the city, which was completely different than under the 
French and Spanish colonies. Daphne Spain also looks at segregation and how the lack of socio-
economic power prohibited blacks from being able to move where good schools were in the city, 
or out to the suburbs of the city like the whites did.
13
 The racial segregation that Spain talks 
about adds to the argument of whites being indifferent to the struggles of the black community.  
John Ingham writes an interesting piece about how blacks used small business ownership 
in the early 1900s to combat residential segregation but also to show that blacks could be 
prosperous. He describes how black businesses that emerged in mostly unsettled territory served 
as a Mecca for the black residents in the city. A new mobility emerged with the expansion of the 
streetcar system and blacks could now travel farther distances to work rather than be forced to 
live in walking distance of their employers.
14
 This is important in showing the growing sense of 
                                                          
11
 The Times-Picayune. "1971: Black Panthers acquitted after tangle with New Orleans police." NOLA.com. 
December 14, 2011. http://www.nola.com/175years/index.ssf/2011/12/1971_black_panthers_acquitted.html 
(accessed January 15, 2012); hereafter cited as “1971.” 
12
 Arnold Hirsch and Joseph Logsdon. Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1992; hereafter cited as Creole New Orleans. 
13
 Daphne Spain. "Race Relations and Residential Segregation in New Orleans: Two Centuries of Paradox." Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Jan. 1979: 82-96; hereafter cited as "Race Relations and 
Residential Segregation in New Orleans.” 
14
 John N. Ingham. "Building Businesses, Creating Communities: Residential Segregation and the Growth of 
African American Business in Southern Cities, 1880-1915." The Business History Review, 2003: 639-665; hereafter 
cited as "Building Businesses, Creating Communities.” 
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community amongst the black population. Ingham’s article also helps to explain, along with 
Spain, the residential segregation that was becoming more prevalent. 
The inadequate conditions in the Ninth Ward and the New Orleans public school system 
were seen as permissible by the municipal government even though they had a negative effect on 
the blacks. That was the focal point of Juliette Landphair’s piece entitled Sewerage, Sidewalks, 
and Schools: The New Orleans Ninth Ward and Public School Desegregation.
15
 She goes into 
how the Ninth Ward was constructed out of the swamps for the blacks and poor whites’ in the 
city and how the city provided minimal upkeep for this area of New Orleans. She also researched 
the integration of the public school system which caused a lot of controversy in the white 
community. The Jennings Daily News ran a story about the integration of the school system 
which provided illuminating quotes about the white state legislature’s attitude towards the 
integration. The white mothers of students who had removed their children from these schools 
were a new surprising element that added to the racial discussion.
16
 This is the first time in New 
Orleans that white women got involved in racial protests.  
William Sundstrom wrote a piece about the state of blacks in America during the Great 
Depression which was used to mirror the black population of New Orleans in this thesis. His 
piece adds a contradictory tone to the racial debate being presented in this paper.
17
 It is important 
to show the black community working together to labor their way up from the bottom of society 
at one of the most economic troubling time in American history. This article pairs with the 
Ingham piece as both articles agree that there were still harsh discrepancies between the white 
and black communities despite the best efforts of the African Americans. These sources helped 
to show some of the positives that were coming out of the racism and segregationist attitude of 
white New Orleanians. 
Hurricane Katrina will be used to connect the negligence of the United States federal 
government and the local New Orleans government to keep its citizens safe. It is a very well 
documented disaster on the records of United States history. Aside from the Colten and Fischetti 
                                                          
15
 Landphair, Juliette. "Sewerage, Sidewalks, and Schools: The New Orleans Ninth Ward and Public School 
Desegregation." Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, 1999: 35-62; hereafter 
cited as “Sewerage, Sidewalks, and Schools.” 
16
 "Four Negro Girls Enter N.O. Schools Today." The Jennings Daily News. November 14, 1960. 
http://newspaperarchive.com/jennings-daily-news/1960-11-14?tag=schools (accessed January 5, 2012); 
hereaftercited as "Four Negro Girls Enter N.O. Schools Today.” 
17
 William Sundstrom. "Last Hired, First Fired? Unemployment and the Urban Black Workers During the Great 
Depression." The Journal of Economic History, 1992: 415-429; hereafter cited as “Last Hired, First Fired?” 
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pieces on the environmental inequalities of New Orleans, newspapers, and the mayor have come 
out to speak about the racialization of Katrina. A map created by a researcher at Louisiana State 
University is one of the most telling because it shows how it was mostly black neighborhoods 
that were still heavily inundated with water up to a week after the Katrina destroyed the levees. 
This storm and the media reports written after it proved to the United States public that there 
were still major class divisions between the white and black populations. This is exemplified in 
two pictures taken by the Associated Press describing the scene of two nearly identical scenes of 
people carrying food through the flood waters. One was of a black youth who was described as 
“looting” what he carried and one photo was of a white couple who was simply “carrying” their 
goods. 
All of this research is important to compiling a detailed story of the oppression that was 
enforced by local and federal governments. The black inhabitants of New Orleans had been 
turned into second-class citizens because of federal and municipal actions that segregated them 
from enjoying the same safety that whites in the city benefitted from. This is the gap in history 
that will be filled. It is a large story that incorporates race-based violence, segregation, and the 
environmental injustices in black communities. Without one of these histories, the story of the 
blacks becoming second-class citizens in New Orleans would be incomplete.  
 The first chapter focuses its research on the foundation of the city. New Orleans has a 
significantly different history than most of the United States as it was under the control of three different 
world powers during its past. The French, Spanish, and Americans all participated in the practice of 
slavery but all had different methods of slave ownership which will be described. The chapter will look 
into how the Haitian played into the dynamics of slave’s relations with their master in New Orleans. The 
city’s roots in slavery help to construct how whites and blacks interacted while living amongst each other 
for the following three centuries. 
 The second chapter will follow the progression of New Orleans building its defensives against the 
forces of nature using slave labor, the expansion of the city, violence in post-Civil War New Orleans and 
yellow fever epidemics. In this chapter, the divide between black and white in the city begins to grow 
with an emergent immigrant and migrant community entering the city. As immigrants moved into New 
Orleans they began to assimilate into American culture. The whites that migrated to the city brought their 
racist ideologies that the immigrants began to absorb as well. More Americans moving to New Orleans 
helped to codify the segregationist attitude that was held by Americans nationwide in the city which had 
formerly been a melting pot of race and culture. The yellow fever epidemics were blamed on the poor, 
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black communities in the 1800s because they were living without access to proper sanitation and 
sewerage to remove water when the city flooded. This chapter will examine the Riot of 1866 and 
lynchings as a way whites used violence to keep the black citizens in their lower class positions. This 
continued throughout the city’s history.  
 The following chapter will focus on 20th
th
 century looking at how the expanding infrastructure of 
the city affected the black citizens. Looking at the public school system, a lack of sewerage in black 
communities, and the oppression of the New Orleans Police Department which led blacks to organize 
themselves to try to fight back against the white federal and local governments. The organizing of black 
citizens is exemplified by the NAACP and Black Panther Party who played crucial roles in trying to 
protect the black citizen’s rights and lives. Black citizens were feeling the wrath of the police department 
citywide but had no representation of the police force or in local government and they struggled to find 
someone who would hear their pleas for equality.  
 The final chapter will examine the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries and the effects of 
environmental inequality. A focus will be put on the examples of a federally declared Superfund site in 
the lower Ninth Ward and the disastrous effect Hurricane Katrina had on the population of New Orleans, 
specifically the black inhabitants. This time period is also important as blacks gained a greater foot in city 
politics taking control of the mayor’s office and the executive position in the police department. This 
section will show the attempted reformation of the most notoriously corrupt and violent police force in the 
United States as they try to control local gangs, drug trade, and a climbing murder rate in the black 
communities.  The police interactions and the negligence of the federal government aided in creating one 
of the biggest natural disasters that the United States has had on its soil, Hurricane Katrina. These 
chapters will demonstrate how the black citizens of New Orleans were forced and kept in a position of 
being second-class citizens by the colonial, federal, and local governments that controlled New Orleans.
10 
 
Chapter 1: A Colonial City Built by Slaves 
This chapter will look at New Orleans and its history with colonial powers and how the 
French, Spanish, and American colonial governments impacted the black population since the 
foundation of the city in the early 18
th
 century through the middle of the 19
th
 century. New 
Orleans has a much different story compared to most American cities in the United States 
because of the many different European influences. The French founded the city, then ceded to 
the Spanish, who later returned it to French control, and then finally sold New Orleans to the 
United States. This has caused a blending of cultures and people that is seen nowhere else in the 
United States. It has created a unique story of the racialization of New Orleans from its very 
beginnings as a commercial empire on the continent. 
 New Orleans is one of the oldest cities in North America. It was founded by the French 
in 1718. There were many French settlers in the area of New Orleans before The Mississippi 
Company
1
 took charge of its construction and named it after the French regent, Philippe 
d’Orléans, who was in control of the territory.2 The company built New Orleans up on the 
natural levee that was created by the Mississippi River’s years of depositing sediment along its 
banks. They thought that the top of the levee would be the safest place that the growing city 
could be built.
3
 If they were up on the levee then all the flood water would drain into the lower 
lying basin where current day New Orleans lies. This area was a pestilential swamp that bred 
disease. Stopping the floodwater from poring over into this area was important to the health of 
the city.  
Man-made levees, along with ones that had formed naturally with the flow of the 
Mississippi river, were used to try to subdue the constant flooding in the site where the city was 
being constructed.  These levees were dug and fortified with the manpower of over one thousand 
prisoners that had been shipped over from Europe and a few other contractors.
4
 Using prisoner 
labor was common during the time and they were used much like slaves. Due to waterborne 
diseases and lack of other resources such as food, these prisoners died off and were replaced by 
                                                          
1
  Jennifer M. Spear. Early America: History, Context, Culture : Race, Sex, and Social Order in Early New Orleans. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. 37; hereafter cited as Early America. 
2
  Ibid., 19. 
3
 Colten, An Unnatural Metropolis, 17. 
4
 Elizabeth Fussell. "Constructing New Orleans, Constructing Race: A Population History of New Orleans." Journal 
of American History, 2007: 846-855; hereafter cited as “Constructing New Orleans, Constructing Race.” 
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African slaves who were captured by the French. Along with African slaves, the French in early 
Louisiana used Indians as slaves but found them to be more difficult to ensnare and take hostage. 
The French “habitants complained that Indian slaves ‘deserted when hard pressed’ and that they 
could ‘not get nearly as much service from them as the negroes.’”5 The Indian slaves knew the 
land that they were being enslaved in and could escape with more ease than the African slaves 
who were in an alien environment. The Indians proved to be a more helpful ally because they 
knew the land and the agricultural potential. This benefitted both the French and Spanish 
colonies which had prosperous relationships with Indians as trading partners of grains and fur.
6
 
This made Africans the slave of choice and most ideal for labor in the colony. The sickness that 
permeated from the swamps below the city plagued the slaves and many suffered the same fate 
as the European prisoners before them.
7
 A result of the growing population and economic status 
of New Orleans led the city to have to expand into the swamps. As stated, these were a breeding 
ground for diseases that thrived in stagnant water which was perpetuated by the constant 
flooding of the Mississippi River over the levees into this low lying territory. This meant that 
efforts needed to be doubled to keep water from entering the low lying parts of the city and new 
technologies for getting the water out of the city if it did flood. 
The city could not have been built without the slave labor that the French employed.  
Throughout the first forty years that the French controlled the city, everything from agriculture 
and construction to child care were based upon slave labor. The French changed to a more 
agricultural economy that used slaves for labor in the tobacco and rice fields.
8
 As is typical of 
slavery driven societies, violence was used to motivate the slaves and prevent them from 
attempting to escape. In early New Orleans there was a law set down by the governing body that 
stated how the slaves are supposed to be treated and how in turn, they treated their masters. This 
law was called the “Code Noir” and was put into place in 1724.9 The Code Noir made it illegal to 
treat slaves in a “barbarous and inhumane” way. Capturing a person and putting them in captivity 
making them work for no wages is in itself barbaric and inhumane. These codes were rarely 
enforced by the government because the French recognized the ironic situation.
10
  Along with the 
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 Spear, Early America, 54. 
6
 Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana,  302. 
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 Fussel, “Constructing New Orleans, Constructing Race.” 
8
 Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana, 10. 
9
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treatment of slaves during the early French colonial occupation of the city, the slaves also had to 
protect themselves from getting sick from the swamps that were exuding disease.  One of the 
French settlers, James Pitot, described the wetlands surrounding the city as a, ‘“pestilential fever 
that manifests itself in a most violent way’ during the late summer months particularly among 
‘strangers.’”11 The strangers, in this case, were the slaves brought from Africa.  All the putrid 
organic matter was rotting in the swamps releasing effluvia that no African slaves had ever come 
into contact with in their homeland. The savage beatings by the slave masters combined with the 
toxic fumes being released from the swamps and mosquito bites, which caused yellow fever, 
made New Orleans an inhospitable place for blacks under French control.  
Conditions improved for the enslaved and blacks during the four decade period that the 
Spanish took control of the city. In 1763, the Spanish were given New Orleans in the Treaty of 
Paris. New Orleans was economically a disaster when the Spanish took control.
12
 There were 
only enough crops for the farmers to produce a sustainable amount of food for the city and little 
was being exported. In 1777, Spain reopened the slave trade and sought to turn around the 
economy with a plantation style of farming which had proven to be very lucrative in the 
Caribbean.
13
 Africans were being brought into the area by the boatload from the African 
continent and the Spanish had to lay down their own guidelines about slave ownership. Just 
before the slave trade in new Spanish territory was opened again, the Spanish court made an 
important ruling in 1773 that would open up a new opportunity for slaves to gain freedom. The 
court ruled in a decision that slaves were able to pay for their own freedom from their owners, 
for a fair price, by means of working a job on the side or from a gift from a friend or 
inheritance.
14
 These newly freed slaves were called “gen de couleur libres.”15  
This was a monumental ruling that changed the way slaves thought of their captivity. 
Now there was a way out of the shackles of slavery if a slave worked hard enough, they could be 
free and no longer subjected to the oppression of the majority French owners. This created a 
“tripartite racial system” that consisted of Europeans at the top, freed blacks in the middle, and 
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enslaved blacks at the bottom. While there may have been some French elites who did not agree 
with letting their slave’s buy their own freedom, it was a win-win situation for all involved.16 
The price of slaves had dropped and it was easy to replace those who bought their freedom from 
their owners. The slave’s ultimately worked harder so that they could purchase their own 
freedom which boosted the New Orleans economy, which again benefitted the slave owners. 
The Spanish were able to uplift a dying region in the south simply by giving the slaves 
more freedoms and opportunities than the French. Jennifer Spears explains in her book, Early 
America: History, Context, Culture: Race, Sex, and Social Order in Early New Orleans, that the 
enslaved preferred being under Spanish rule compared to French because they were treated more 
fairly. The freed slaves agreed. In the 1790’s the governor of the Spanish Louisiana territory, 
Baron de Carondelet, was convinced that the revolution in Saint Domingue (Haiti) was brought 
on by the mistreatment of slaves and made efforts to “see to it that Louisiana slaves were not 
similarly provoked into rebellion.”17 Spears provided evidence that it was the opinion of some of 
the freed slaves that they would be treated better under the rule of the Spanish.
18
 “Within the first 
decade of Spanish rule, the number of free people of color in New Orleans tripled… and their 
numbers continued to increase significantly through the end of the century reaching 1,500 in 
1805.”19  Carondelet banned the slave trade in 1796 which made the slave population in New 
Orleans decrease. In 1801, the Louisiana territory was returned to the French for a few brief 
years until it was sold by Napoleon to the United States in 1803.
20
 
New Orleans struggled with this predicament through its later history of classifying 
individuals. The city was a melting pot of French, Spanish, black, Native American and 
American people who had been intermingling for the first hundred years of New Orleans history 
and creating entirely new subclasses. These new subclasses were also supplemented by the influx 
of refugees from the Haitian Revolution.  According to Elizabeth Fussel, who wrote 
Constructing New Orleans, Constructing Race: A Population History of New Orleans, “the city 
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[New Orleans] more than doubled in size from the ten thousand refugees from the 1794-1804 
rebellion in Haiti who found a new home in New Orleans.”21  
The Haitian Revolution resulted in white lower class citizens in Haiti wanting to ally 
themselves with the slaves because of what they stood to gain from the power that the former 
slaves were soon to have in Haiti. Seafarers were the first to bring the sentiments of the Haitian 
rebels over to the US and many of the multi-racial port workers played a hand in the spread of 
the news of revolt to New Orleans.
22
 This surge of people from Haiti saw many of the black 
immigrants returned to slavery in the United States and harsher restrictions for slaves under the 
Spanish regime.
23
 It is interesting to point out that it was also the lower class whites who were 
spreading the message of revolution. This was during the era of the French Revolution and the 
lower class French who allied themselves with the former slaves in Haiti wanted to support 
equality for all people, even if that included freeing the slaves.
24
  
The slave owners and Spanish did not want any of their slaves to get ideas from the 
Haitian slaves about rebelling against them so they imposed harsher punishments for 
insubordination.
25
 “Repressive measures were also directed at the large number of freed blacks, 
feared by whites as a potential source of insurrection. Laws were passed ‘to make it harder for 
masters to free their slaves, regulation after regulation attempted to control the movements of 
Blacks and to prohibit the assembly of, or indeed any contact between, free Blacks and 
slaves.’”26 The passing of stricter legislation against freed blacks made sense as they had the 
most mobility out of the growing, oppressed population. Paralleling the timeline of changes in 
regimes at the turn of the 19
th
 century was the restriction of manumission. With the French 
returning briefly to power and then the United States buying the territory from France, the slaves 
were now governed by stricter slave laws that the United States had set in place. 
The city’s expansion marked the opening of the 19th century. (See Maps on Page 16 and 
17)  From 1791 to 1820 the population grew almost seven times the size it was in 1791.
27
 This 
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was due to an increasing immigrant population coming in from Ireland, Germany, Americans 
seeking to relocate, and Haitians as was mentioned earlier.
28
 Immigrants and freed blacks were 
competing for the same jobs and immigrants had to show that they should be accepted as white 
too by becoming racist towards the gens de couluer libres. The immigrants used the color of 
their skin to give them the edge up on the freed slaves in the labor market and used what they 
saw from Americans to discriminate against them. “The slave population was outstripped by that 
of the Irish who quickly became the bulk of the public workforce.”29 There was also a divide in 
the non-colored population. People of color and the Creoles, citizens of French or Spanish 
ancestry, did not get along with the Americans or recent immigrants. The Americans thought that 
any remnants of old colonial systems should be done away with and there should especially be 
no marriages allowed between Creoles and the freed slaves.
30
 There was also little interaction 
between the Americans and blacks in the city because of the demographics. New Orleans was 
divided into three sections. Two were where the Creoles and gens de couluer libres lived and one 
was where the Americans and immigrants lived.
31
 The demographics in the city matched up 
perfectly with the divide into three municipalities. The population of the city in 1805 was about 
33% black, a third white, and a third Creole.
32
 
In the early to mid-19
th
 century, the white population of New Orleans began to fully 
embrace the American laws regarding slavery and how free blacks were to be treated. The city 
was becoming a more American city during this time and with the influx of Americans moving 
to this commerce capital of the south, they brought their money and their ideologies with them. 
Slavery had been a staple in the British colonies like it had been in the French and Spanish but 
their ideas paralleled that of the French more than the Spanish. In the United States, slaves were 
not allowed to buy their freedom and were only set free if they were freed by their owner 
directly, freed in their owners will when they died, or if they ran away and became a fugitive.
33
 
The Americans who moved to New Orleans found it strange how many freed slaves there were 
in the city and did not want to associate with them because they still saw them to be in the same 
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class as slaves. The French and Spanish saw them differently, as a higher class because of their 
work ethic and the quality of their skilled labor.
34
  
How blacks were seen by the migrant American ruling class helped to set the scene for 
the next two centuries. Blacks were never given equal respect or rights during the colonial era in 
New Orleans but it was clear that some colonial powers treated blacks more respectably, giving 
them more of a chance to advance in society. Slaves being allowed to purchase their freedom 
during the Spanish colonial period introduced a whole new class of blacks into American society 
in the south after the Louisiana Purchase. The United States never had to deal with a large 
population of freed black slaves before and in New Orleans they made up about 33 percent of the 
city. The racial tensions would continue to be seen as more blacks were freed from slavery and 
as the infrastructure was built in a way that did not positively affect the minorities in New 
Orleans.  
Figure 1. 
35
 
      (Figure 1 shows the original plan of the city) 
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Figure 2.        
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(Figure 2 represents the immense growth of New Orleans from 1728-1816) 
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Chapter 2: Flooding, Yellow Fever Epidemics, and Post-Civil War New Orleans 
 Attempting to control nature plays a large role in the history of New Orleans as well as its 
racial narrative. Looking back on the natural disasters that have affected New Orleans and the 
amenities constructed to prevent them, it is often the black population of the city that is not 
protected from such events. The manpower to build the first levees was put on the backs of 
African slaves as was much of the construction of 17
th 
and 18
th
 century New Orleans. From then 
on, the levees needed constant reinforcement and extension as the city expanded and a system 
needed to be put in place to pump water out of the city should a flood breach the levees. The 
black communities were some of the last to receive these pumps and general sewerage systems. 
This chapter will examine the construction of the levees, the failures of New Orleans keeping the 
city from flooding, and why it was the black population of the city that was most affected. Going 
hand in hand with the flooding in New Orleans, were the epidemics of yellow fever that struck 
the city in the 1800s. This section will highlight the creation of the sewerage system, the constant 
struggle to drain areas of New Orleans throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century.  
The construction of levees began in the 1720s by the French who used slave labor to 
propel the production. The French contracted the Company of the Indies to start building the 
levees in 1724.
37
 The first levees to protect New Orleans from the Mississippi River were about 
four feet higher than the old natural levee. This was a public works project and was not privately 
funded but the levee only protected the inner city, about 40 square blocks.
38
 However, “colonial 
laws enacted in 1728 and in 1743 required individual landowners to build levees.”39 The 
landowner’s levees were built to help protect the agricultural districts of New Orleans which the 
city did not have the funds to have built. Levees were a necessity as most of New Orleans’ 
economy at the time was agriculture based and the crops had to be protected from floods so that 
they were not ruined. The construction of levees was expensive and took a lot of manpower. It is 
because of this that only the biggest plantations were able to build sufficient levees using slave 
labor.
40
 While the construction of these levees were required by the French and then the Spanish, 
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when the Spanish took over the territory in 1768, there was no standardization of what was 
required for the levees and many were ineffective in large floods.
41
 
 When the United States took over the Louisiana Territory in 1803 and made Louisiana a 
state in 1812, they decided that it was best to keep the levees protecting the inner city 
municipally funded by taxing boats that made harbor there. At this point in the city’s history, the 
population of New Orleans was comprised of about one third whites, one third free people of 
color (gens de couleur), and one third slaves.
42
 The city government claimed that some of the 
ineffectiveness of the levees was due to the fact that ships were constantly running into them 
when they were harbored along the river banks.
43
 The city continued to push for the construction 
of more levees to be built upriver so that the backwater swamps of New Orleans did not 
repeatedly get flooded. The constant floods allowed mosquitoes to breed which became were a 
factor contributing to the cause of yellow fever. According to the World Health Organization, 
New Orleans was plagued with 19 epidemic outbreaks of yellow fever between 1807 and 1905.
44
 
In addition to the threat of sickness breaking out, if the back swamps got too flooded, water 
would inundate the city from the northern, unprotected side. This happened in 1816 when 
privately built levees on the northern parts of the Mississippi River outside New Orleans were 
breached and the back swamp flooded all the way up to the French quarter where it stayed for 
almost a month due to poor drainage systems.
45
 
 Yellow fever outbreaks stemmed from breakages in poorly constructed levees that did not 
properly protect against flooding. “The first outbreak of yellow fever, the most pervasive 
bacterial threat to the city, occurred in 1796, followed by a second in 1799. A more devastating 
flare-up took some 500 lives in 1803.”46 “In 1812 the mortality rate for yellow fever in the city 
approached an alarming 70 percent.”47 Yellow fever is transmitted through a bite from a 
mosquito. Mosquitoes like to breed in warm stagnant water, like that lying in the flooded 
parishes in New Orleans after the levees failed. Improper drainage and the “decay of organic 
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matter in stagnant water”48 led to the perfect breeding ground for mosquitoes to lay their eggs. 
Until New Orleans perfected its drainage and levee system, the goal being to eliminate its 
swamps, the city would have severe outbreaks of yellow fever through the 19
th
 century. Yellow 
fever was not only affecting New Orleans but the whole southern United States. “In 1878 the 
disease spread northward [from New Orleans] along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, with an 
estimated 100,000 cases and 20,000 deaths. Worst hit was Memphis, Tennessee, where at least 
9,000 died and many inhabitants fled, never to return.”49 In Memphis, the city was quick to 
respond the series of outbreaks and installed equal sewerage and water systems to all of its 
citizens, black and white.
50
 This was not the case in New Orleans. 
Those who were most affected were those foreign immigrants and Americans migrating 
to the area. It rarely affected the Creole population or the black population anymore. Yellow 
fever is a disease that if you contract it once and survive, the human body builds up immunity to 
the virus.
51
 The worst epidemic to hit the city was in 1853 when it is thought that 11,000 of the 
city’s 150,000 residents died and around 30,000 to 40,000 were infected with yellow fever.52 The 
outbreaks of yellow fever continued in New Orleans into the 20
th
 century with the last major 
United States outbreak being in New Orleans in 1905.
53
 About 5,000 New Orleanians were 
infected of which 1,000 died.
54
 Many New Orleanians thought that blacks were immune to the 
disease because they had a much lower mortality rate than other populations. Officials made a 
point to target the black community and let them know that just because they typically had 
milder cases of yellow fever did not mean that they were completely unsusceptible and they still 
needed to take proper precautions against it.
55
 This push for blacks to be more aware of the virus 
was the white population of New Orleans expressing that they believed that the virus was 
spreading from the black community because of their unsanitary habits.
56
 By the 1900s, most of 
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the standing water in the swamps had been removed and the levees became more effective 
resulting in less flooding in the city. 
 The residents of New Orleans realized that they needed to be able to effectively drain the 
city early on in its history. The excess water in the city and in the outlying swamps was a cause 
for real concern. The occupants knew that the stench from the swamps of rotting materials and 
stagnant water was not beneficial to their health. The Spanish governor of Louisiana in the late 
18
th
 century, Francisco Luis Hector de Carondelet, ordered that the Carondelet Canal be built to 
ease transportation of water and waste out of the city. It “linked the rear of the city to Bayou St. 
John. This artificial waterway functioned primarily as a link with Lake Pontchartrain but also as 
a sluice for runoff and sewerage when the lake levels allowed movement in that direction.”57 
There was a great need to remove human waste from the city as the population was spreading out 
into the lower, more dangerous parts of the city as it expanded.  The technology of the time was 
unaccommodating of the cities needs. Unless a resident was located on the high ground above 
the Mississippi, it was hard to flush feces and other waste out of the city. Several more canals 
were built through the early and mid-1800s but none could stop the flow of water from going 
both ways. If the water levels rose in Lake Pontchartrain then water would rush back towards the 
city through the canals and would flood the city. This happened on four occasions between 1831 
and 1846.
58
 Looking past these events, in the lower parts of the city, the canal water stood 
stagnant the majority of the time simply due to gravity. While New Orleans receives an average 
rainfall of about 62.1 inches of rain per year
59
, that was not enough to constantly be flushing out 
the canals into Lake Pontchartrain.  
In the 1830s, there was a change in the labor force building levees and canals to drain the 
city. There was a large influx of Irish and German immigrants, as talked about in the previous 
chapter, around this time. The Irish would work for long hours for low wages and became the 
predominant ethnicity in the working class of New Orleans. With each of the city’s 
municipalities taking charge of the levee reinforcement and construction in their area, there was 
a need for unskilled labor that the Irish would fulfill.
60
 The African slaves were seen as too 
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valuable to be used for digging around in the pestilence found in the swampy canals and levees. 
If the slaves were to get sick and die, that would be an immense monetary loss for their owners 
but if the poorly paid Irish immigrants were to die while digging out the swamps then there 
would be no great loss for those financing the project.
61
 All the contractor would need to do is 
find another poor, desperate Irishman to take the deceased’s place. In this era of racial relation in 
New Orleans, the free people of color had accumulated considerable wealth and were famous for 
their skilled labor throughout the city.”62 It is rare in racial history that a black male’s life would 
have a higher value than a white man like it was in this time. It is thought that over 6,000 
Irishmen perished in building the New Basin Canal in New Orleans.
63
  
The efforts put into building the New Basin Canal proved futile when in 1849 the levees 
broke at Pierre Sauvé’s plantation and inundated New Orleans’s poorest parts of the city with 6 
feet of water, where many free blacks lived. The high ground where the rich lived was barely 
affected by the flood but in the poor areas where 12,000 blacks and immigrants resided, they 
were forced to leave their completely inundated homes.
64
 This left a majority of the city 
homeless until the water receded more than a month later.  New Orleans officials decided that 
the best course of action was to rebuild the levees taller and what they deemed to be stronger. 
The state engineer, A.D. Wooldridge, foreshadowed the future of New Orleans in 1850 when he 
said, “I find myself forced to the conclusion that the entire dependence on the leveeing system is 
not only unsafe for us, but I think it will be destructive to those who shall come after us.” 65  
The levee system would continue to plague New Orleans throughout the rest of its 
history, the city’s protection always falling short of what is necessary to keep it safe. During the 
Civil War, the levee system was neglected due to the lack of funding and manpower and the 
upkeep of the levees stayed state controlled but was mainly a federally funded project.
66
 The 
plantation owners and farmers could not spare the resources needed to keep the city dry as the 
majority of their collateral was being spent on the war. New Orleans was captured by the Union 
Navy and the northern government took control over the city. Colten explains that in the post-
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Civil War period, much of the flooding actually comes from the breaches in lake side defenses 
and not the traditionally unsafe Mississippi River levees.
67
 In 1879, the United States Congress 
created the Mississippi River Commission charging it with making a consistently effective levee 
system in the New Orleans area. This Commission’s goal was to eliminate breakages in the 
levees, make the levees stronger, and keep the Mississippi River navigable for trade.
68
 There was 
a labor shortage in New Orleans ever since the slaves had been freed in the Civil War. The black 
population no longer wanted to work maintaining the levees so in 1867, the state of Louisiana 
authorized prison labor as the primary labor force maintaining the levees.
69
 That, combined with 
immigrant recruitment programs in Germany, Belgium, Mexico, and Italy helped to supply the 
menial jobs in post-Civil War New Orleans.
70
 Freed slaves were still limited to mostly working 
in agricultural positions because there was still a lot of anti-black sentiment and racism towards 
blacks that would pervade into the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century.  
 The racist attitude against blacks led to several bouts of violence in New Orleans after the 
Civil War. The free black population was being excluded from voting because of the “Black 
Codes” that were put in effect by the white governing body in the South.71 The Constitutional 
Convention of 1864 codified the expansion of black’s right in the United States but not their 
right to vote. Many blacks who served in the Civil War thought it unfair that blacks died for their 
country but were unable to vote. Some of these radicals reconvened the Convention on July 30, 
1866, in the Mechanics Institute of New Orleans with the goal of overthrowing the states 
government.
72
 This was led by about 25 white men but the supporters who were in attendance 
included about 200 black veterans of the Civil War. During a break in the proceeding, there was 
an altercation between one of the black veterans and a former Confederate outside the Institute 
which resulted in an all out riot that pitted the police and Confederates against the black 
attendees. According to testimonies given before Congress, 38 people were killed and 46 were 
wounded in the events.
73
 The unprovoked attacks on the black citizens led to marshal law and a 
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24 hour curfew being instituted until August 1
st
.
74
 Mob violence was not uncommon during this 
time period.  
Despite being viewed as skilled labor, freed blacks still had little power to control their 
surrounding because of the racism shown in the 1866 riots which was ingrained in white 
community. This is exemplified by the lynchings that occurred not just in New Orleans but all 
over the South. Ida B. Wells goes into great detail about lynching in her pamphlet, The Red 
Record. Lynching was used as a form of oppression to show blacks that while they may be free, 
they are still second class citizens.
75
 In the beginning of the fourth chapter she talks about 
lynchings in New Orleans specifically. She tells the story of a black man who killed a white 
judge while defending his home. The freed man ran leaving his family behind as a white 
lynching party formed to find him. The mob was unable to find him but his family had been 
arrested on the suspicion that they were hiding him. All three brothers were lynched and his 
sisters were flogged and banished from the parish.
76
 This highlights whites’ need to feel power 
over the black population. The mob did not need to kill the assailant’s whole family but they felt 
as though they needed to send a strong message to the rest of the black population that they had 
to stay in their rightful place below the white man. 
A staunch racial divide was created when it came to the issue of installation of public 
amenities in New Orleans. In the mid-1800s, the New Orleans local government began to 
recognize the need for a sewerage system to be put in place to get rid of all the waste that had 
been piling up on the streets of the city. This required money and the ability to fix the system if it 
were to break down.
77
 As talked about in Chapter 1, the city was divided into specific zones 
mainly based on race and heritage. The Americans stayed together in their neighborhood and the 
Creoles and blacks stayed in their neighborhoods. After the United States gained control of the 
territory from the French, the American norm of a bi-racial society began to worm its way into 
New Orleans society.
78
 The tri-racial history that New Orleans pioneered on the continent was a 
                                                          
74
 Reynold, “New Orleans Riot of 1866,” 14. 
75
 Ida B. Wells-Barnett, "The Red Record: Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynching in the United 
States." The Project Gutenberg. 1895. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14977/14977-h/14977-h.htm#chap1 (accessed 
January 16, 2012) 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Landphair, “Sewerage, Sidewalks, and Schools,” 37. 
78
 Fussell, “Constructing New Orleans, Constructing Race,” 849. 
25 
 
now a society of the past and all non-whites were now being lumped together as one race while 
all those of European descent moved closer together, physically and socially. 
 The blacks who resided in New Orleans continued to experience the discrimination that 
was prevalent all over the United States to the people of their race.  
“Racial geography in the urban South always exhibited some degree of 
segregation, particularly sequestering blacks into less desirable quarters. The most 
common form of African American residential cluster was a bottomlands 
settlement near the city boundary. Poor drainage, flimsy housing, and inadequate 
public services characterized such neighborhoods.”79 
Craig Colten is explaining how the black population of New Orleans is a reflection of the greater 
black population in the South. The difference between the black and white citizens was the 
blacks of New Orleans were living in parts of the city that were consistently sinking lower into 
the earth’s surface, exacerbating the poor drainage and flimsy housing that was characteristic of 
their neighborhoods. The combination of living in the lowest lying areas of the city and the poor 
construction of houses were leading towards disaster for the black community. Poor drainage led 
to flood waters lying stagnant for long periods of time making black neighborhoods the center 
for pestilence spreading throughout all of New Orleans. The whites in New Orleans began to 
place the blame on the blacks who lived in these neighborhoods rather than the topography of the 
land, reverting to their racist views of blacks as unkempt brutes who could not take care of 
themselves without white supervision.
80
  
New Orleans political powers did recognize the issues that were creating the blight in 
their city but were slow to implement the proper measures into the wards that needed them most, 
the blackest areas. Colten identifies the two factors that led to full blown segregation in New 
Orleans as, “(1) the systematic reorganization of public works and (2) methodical deprivation of 
equal treatment to one racial group.”81 The city leaders knew that if they put more pumps around 
the city and continued draining the wetlands around the New Orleans that eventually the sickness 
and putrid conditions that infested the city would disappear. Drainage was always going to be a 
problem but the upper classes had the opportunity to avoid it by buying real-estate in the drier, 
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more desirable areas on the city. The poor and the blacks had to make the best out of the 
neighborhoods that they were confined to. 
The first public works program was designed to benefit all members of the New Orleans 
community including black citizens. Those who conceptualized the plans put them into action in 
1899 and conceptualized it to cover all areas of the city, even those that were not “built up.”82 
The thinking behind this was that draining these areas would decrease the possibility of disease 
working its way into the city again while also creating new districts for the city to expand into. 
Those putting this plan into effect followed through with their plan but it ran short of funds 
making it impossible, initially, to serve all communities.
83
 The planners wanted to focus these 
new efforts into the main business district and the neighborhood surrounding it. This 
neighborhood was thought to be about 30% black at the time, proving that New Orleans was 
making an effort to include its whole population and not just the whites.
84
 “The initial drainage 
effort encompassed two wards with higher than average African American population.”85 This 
was an important step for the city but they were unable to keep the forward momentum going to 
uplift the entire city out of the sludge it was built on.  
After the initial installment on the drainage system, the divide between black and white 
populations expanded. While the city in general saw an overall decrease in the amount of 
flooding and sickness in the areas that now had proper drainage systems, those without them 
continued to struggle with diseases that came with living in swamp-like conditions. The black 
population of the city was still being hardest hit by malaria and typhoid in 1907 and the city 
health officials pointed the finger at the black community. “In keeping with prevailing medical 
views, public health authorities blamed this situation on African Americans. ‘Improvement in the 
colored death rate has been retarded by reckless and improvident ways of the race and their utter 
disregard for all hygienic and sanitary laws.’”86 The black communities referred to may have 
been disobeying the city’s waste dumping laws but it was because they had no other options. 
While the high value communities in the city were being properly drained and there was no 
longer pestilence breeding in the streets, the poor and black communities could do nothing about 
the fact that they were not receiving the same amenities. No community wants to live in squalor 
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but if it does not have the resources to remove the waste and those who do have the capital are 
unwilling to share what they have, there is no chance for improvement. 
The gap between black and white is again highlighted when major sewerage companies 
started connecting neighborhoods to its grid. Troesken pointed out that “the institutional and 
cultural norms that defined Jim Crow were pervasive, and there is no doubt that they extended, in 
some degree, to the provisions of local water and sewerage services.”87 These racial divisions in 
plumbing services were seen nationwide in Savannah, Georgia, where black neighborhoods were 
some of the last to receive connections to water mains and in Memphis, Tennessee, where 
sewerage companies were slow in making the connection as well. In Savannah, “88 percent of 
white-occupied addresses fronted streets with sewer mains; and only 59 percent of black-
occupied addresses fronted such streets.”88 Both of these cities were also hotbeds during the 
yellow fever epidemic in the United States in the 19
th
 century.
89
 The cost alone to have a sewer 
connection made to a private dwelling was impossible for many blacks and the poor residents to 
afford. The city sewerage company, the Sewerage and Water Board, charged anywhere from $25 
to $50 to connect to the grid in the early years of the 20
th
 century.
90
  
With the prices being so high to connect to the sewerage infrastructure, many poor blacks 
continued to use privies and outhouses contributing to unsanitary conditions in the city. 
According to an 1878 report by Dr. Holt, the Sanitary Inspector of the fourth district in New 
Orleans, privies and the “human filth”91 that they excrete were a major reason for the yellow 
fever outbreaks and unsanitary conditions in the city. As he describes it, “it may be properly 
stated that the people have a huge privy in common, and the inhabitants of New Orleans live 
upon a dung heap.”92 By 1910 the Sewerage and Water Board began to rethink the connection 
rates as less than 20 percent of the city connected to the system and in 1911, with the assistance 
of municipal funding, the board completely did away with connection fees and started expanding 
the network to all residents.
93
 As the city tried to expand its sanitation system, areas that were 
formerly unconnected and in large part uninhabited were now getting mediocre municipal 
services. The municipal funding, though, was unable to keep up with the expansion of the city. 
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The attempted increase of these services led to more blacks moving into the uninhabited, 
cheaper, and again lower lying sections of New Orleans which quickly became overcrowded. For 
the most part, whites had no desire to move into such neighborhoods because they comprised the 
more affluent population of the city and were able to stay in the areas of the city with more 
reliable connection and better drainage.
94
  
The American institution of segregation and Jim Crow era made it much easier for whites 
not to care about the poor conditions in predominantly black neighborhoods in New Orleans. 
“Segregation made it easier for local politicians to deny service to blacks because when 
neighborhoods were exclusively black, or nearly so, those neighborhoods could have been 
denied service without unduly affecting whites.”95 The unsanitary conditions that were 
stereotypical of black neighborhoods were the only concerns for whites. When the whites 
thought that there was a pestilence coming out of the black neighborhoods they would blame it 
on the race of the resident and not the situation that the person was forced to live in. Yellow 
fever was a result of the New Orleans climate and not the black community’s sanitary conditions. 
Even though the city tried to make surroundings more sanitary in all parishes of New Orleans, 
they fell short in the poor black neighborhoods. The anger of whites after the Civil War began 
stirred racial tensions that would lead to violence and this aggression would pervade into the 
following centuries. This attitude will continually be shown later on in the 20
th
 century as the 
inner city of New Orleans becomes racially darker and as means of transportation to and from 
the suburbs becomes more readily available, providing greater mobility for whites move out of 
the city. 
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Chapter 3:  Segregation and Police Brutality in the Big Easy During the Civil Rights Movement 
During the 20
th
 century New Orleans became more segregated as the disparities between 
the white and black communities became more defined. The improved infrastructure, like the 
construction of the Lake Pontchartrain Bridge and the advancements to the street car system, 
increased the mobility of both the white and black populations of the city. Although both groups 
became more mobile, more of the city’s capital belonged to the New Orleans’s white citizens 
which made it possible for them to live further outside the city, away from the lower class black 
communities. Housing projects that had previously been occupied by predominately white 
communities became lower class black neighborhoods as the whites moved to the suburbs. This 
was the trend all over the United States as African Americans moved into large urban centers, 
whites fled to the suburbs where there was less possibility of racial mixing. This chapter will 
look at the position this left African Americans in. The chapter will also focus on oppression in 
the inner city against black population by the police and local government. Many organizations 
were created by the black citizens to counteract the oppression they were facing fueled by 
national organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and 
the Black Panther Party to local organizing groups.  The extraction of white capital from the city 
led to the conditions creating a majority lower class black inner city in New Orleans and it will 
set up the unequal conditions for blacks that pervaded into the 21
st
 century. 
The Great Migration played a crucial role in the redistribution of blacks throughout the 
United States, including New Orleans. “In 1900, just under 740,000 African Americans lived 
outside the South, only 8 percent of the nation’s total black population… By 1970, more than 
10.6 million African Americans lived outside the South, 47% of the nation’s populations.”96 The 
black population was migrating to the North in search of jobs that were being created by new 
industries such as steel mills, the new automotive industry, and war time factories. During World 
War I and II, jobs opened up in factories because the former workers were sent to Europe to 
fight. The job opportunities opening up to many blacks, along with the incentive of leaving a 
racist South, led them to head north to gain better employment.
97
 Those that did not have the 
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means to leave the South had even less of a chance to prosper because not only were they black 
but they were poor. 
 The Jim Crow era in New Orleans continued the tradition of blacks receiving unequal 
city services in their neighborhoods. Whites and blacks became more divided as segregation 
began to play a more active role in daily life. The former melting pot of Creole, blacks, and 
whites had degraded into separated bi-racial city as the color of a person’s skin began to show 
whether a New Orleans citizen was innately privileged or not.  The city council of New Orleans 
passed Ordinance Number 8037 that segregated white and black neighborhoods in 1924. The 
ordinance stopped blacks from taking up residences in established white neighborhoods.
98
 In the 
newly drained areas of the city, developers made deed covenants that excluded blacks from 
being able to purchase residences in the neighborhoods and also priced the houses out of the 
price range of many black families.
99
 While there were new neighborhoods being erected to 
serve the white population in the city, as Daphne Spain argues in her piece Race Relations and 
Residential Segregation in New Orleans, the “Wood Pump,” which drained the swamps to make 
room for these new white communities, was a tool used to segregate the community.  “The 
process of pumping excess water proved extremely expensive, and the drainage operation was 
consequently limited to the lakeshore area, where the affluent whites planned to settle.”100 Spain 
also points to the expansion of the street car system as another factor affecting the flight of 
whites from the city.
101
 The further the streetcar lines extended from the center of the city, the 
more the white population had the opportunity to live further from where they worked which had 
an encroaching black population.  
 Real-estate contracts disallowing blacks from living in certain areas were a contributing 
factor to not only the inequity of schools but the poor sewerage systems that predominately black 
neighborhoods received. The deed covenants forced blacks to buy or rent in lower lying areas of 
the city which were harder to drain and easier to flood. Colten describes this when he says that, 
“although the improved drainage system opened new areas to black residences, at the same time 
it contributed to the segregation, reflecting established patterns of the turning low-value land 
associated with environment problems over to minority populations. The development of 
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lakefront property also requires expansion of the drainage system, and this improvement 
contributed to segregation in the higher-valued [and higher laying] area restricted to whites. This 
pushing of blacks to lower laying parts of the city put them in areas of the city like the Ninth 
Ward located right along the Mississippi River and in the industrial district in lower parts of the 
bowl.”102 The white people of New Orleans thought that zoning and comprehensive planning 
should be placed under the Jim Crow policies that were being used to separate the races.
103
 The 
lower lying parts of the city would continually have drainage problems through present day 
 These lower lying areas to the east and west of the city turned into havens of the black 
community. While they were susceptible to flooding, these neighborhoods were transformed into 
small business districts for the black citizens. Small black owned businesses sprouted up in these 
areas after the Civil War and grew from there.
104
 These businesses included lunch counters, 
saloons, groceries, and other little operations. These businesses helped bring money to the black 
business owners.
105
 The whites would not allow blacks into certain areas of the city and so they 
had to build their own amenities. This helped to uplift the black community slightly because they 
knew that the money they were spending was going to a black owned business and that they did 
not have to feel segregated against since they did not have to leave their neighborhood. These 
small neighborhoods brought in new black citizens from all over Louisiana who were also tired 
of the residential segregation. The black population of the city grew by about 50 percent during 
this time.
106
 The black community moving to the areas where black businesses were located 
actually increased the amount of residential segregation in the city.
107
 The blacks who formerly 
had to live closer to their jobs and closer to basic amenities like food before the streetcar system 
was expanded could now move into neighborhoods where they were accepted. 
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Figure 3. 
108
 
(Figure 3 shows the Canal Street streetcars new expansion and prevalence in the early 1900s) 
While whites kept their jobs in the city and changed where they laid their heads at night, 
blacks in the city during the Jim Crow era were not able to find high paying jobs because they 
were still considered unskilled laborers by the majority of business owners in New Orleans. Most 
of the lowest paying jobs were taken by black and immigrant workers. Ninety percent of the 
work force in public works projects was black in 1900.
109
 By the 1920s, several descendants of 
free black Creoles were leading the fight against racial restrictions such as disenfranchisement 
and segregation ordinances in housing, schools, and transportation. Black laborers were being 
specifically excluded from work in shipyards, one of the most lucrative businesses in the city. 
New Orleans also came to be one of the largest ports for the importation of oil in to the United 
States. The oil business was the biggest industry in the city and the black citizens not allowed to 
break into that labor force as well.
110
 While they were not permitted to work in the shipyards 
loading and unloading boats, shipbuilding plants were constructed in the Ninth Ward that 
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attracted a lot of African American workers to the area.  New Orleans was the endpoint to most 
southern railroad lines and was where southern commodities, such as cotton, were loaded on 
boats to be exported around the world.
111
 Working in train depots helped provide some jobs but 
most looked to the boat building yards when looking for work.  
During WWII era, New Orleans was one of the largest ship manufacturers in the United 
States. 1942 there were only 100 black laborers in the ship building industry but there were over 
1,500 trained mechanics that were black.
112
   The Higgins Industries shipyard in New Orleans 
made a vow to make over 50 percent of their labor black but did not follow through due to 
protests from the white labor force.
113
 This would have created thousands of jobs for blacks in 
the city but due to the whites not wanting to have to work in close proximity to blacks, they 
found that they were not completely welcome in this industry. One of the reasons that blacks had 
such a hard time finding good jobs was their lack of representation in the local government.  
During the Jim Crow era in the south, there was no possibility of a black person getting 
elected to any position of authority. One of the main obstacles that had to be overcome was that 
very few blacks were registered to vote at the time. In 1940, the population of New Orleans was 
around 500,000 people, about one third of the population was black; and only 400 blacks who 
lived in the city were registered voters.
114
 With no voice in the political community, there was 
little chance of improving the situation that blacks were living in. The small black voting bloc 
disabled them from being able to fight back against one of the most notoriously violent and 
corrupt police forces in the United States.
115
 In 1943, Pastor Abraham Lincoln Davis and Ernest 
J. Wright formed the Louisiana Association for the Progress of Negro Citizens to encourage 
blacks to register to vote and the local black paper, the Louisiana Weekly pushed its readers to do 
the same.
116
 
 The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) has long been cited for their uncouth 
practices and for being a infamously corrupt office. All officers in the NOPD in the city were 
white for the first three decades of the 20
th
 century. During World War II, the NOPD was 
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infamous “for not cracking down on prostitution, gambling, and other forms of vice, as crime 
rose in the city.”117 This lack of discipline in the department made the black citizens of New 
Orleans want to push for the police force to be integrated so they would not be taken advantage 
of. The blacks formed a petition to be delivered to the mayor’s office asking that the blacks be 
given a chance to become police officers. The mayor from the mid 30s through 1946, Robert 
Maestri, was known for neglecting the concerns of the black community and did nothing to aid 
the passing of this legislation that pushed for equal employment practices in the police 
department.  
The “municipal decay”118 in the WWII era New Orleans was somewhat attributed to the 
war effort which removed necessary resources to maintain infrastructure and  resources from the 
city and the whole country but it was also due to the negligence on the mayor’s part. “Negroes 
and labor fared poorly during the Maestri years. Blacks held only the most menial jobs in the city 
government and had little hope for advancement.”119 The black community led by Pastor 
Abraham Lincoln Davis and the Negro Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance (NIMA), saw 
the lack of black police officers and took action. They went through with an investigation 
concerning the hiring process of the New Orleans Police Department. The conclusion of their 
research was that there was no law against blacks being hired and so Davis and NIMA swayed 
the mayor to the decision that he must allow blacks into the police academy if they were 
qualified. Maestri decided to let 25 blacks take the test to become officers in 1946 during his last 
year in office.
120
 The reason that the black community wanted black police officers in the city 
was because they wanted people of their own race patrolling their neighborhoods. They thought 
that it would prevent events of police brutality and unlawful arrests that had been associated with 
the historically white police force.   
 When Maestri was replaced in 1946 by Delessepps Story Morrison, a reformer who 
wanted to completely restructure the police force, the black community thought that they might 
have  a chance to have blacks represented on the NOPD. They were mistaken. Morrison 
appointed a new police superintendent Adair Watter who was a former military man and was 
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brought in specifically for the reason of reforming the police department.
121
 Four black citizens 
passed the police test in 1946. The applicants had to be cleared by the Superintendent Watters 
and Mayor Morrison before they could become police officers but they did not receive the 
approval from either.
122
 The concerns that were brought up with having black police officers 
were that they did not think that the white population of the city would obligingly take orders 
from black males, no matter what his official status was. Leonard Moore states in his book that, 
“one of the main concerns was the fear that African American police officers would harass and 
rape white women.”123 This leads one to believe that no blacks are to be trusted in positions of 
power because they cannot handle the duties in the same way a white man could. The whites 
seemed to be under the impression that all blacks would take advantage of their power to enact 
revenge on the white community for their ancestor’s participation in the slave trade. Ironically, 
these fears of the raping of white women by black police officers were the realities black women 
faced from white officers.
124
 
 By 1949, there had still been no appointment of black officers to the New Orleans Police 
Department and cases of police brutality were on the rise. On hearing of the despicable actions of 
the white police force when they were accused of hitting and then throwing a pregnant black 
woman to the ground, the NAACP stepped in to try and bring greater attention to the 
mistreatment and oppression that blacks in New Orleans were forced to live under. The NAACP 
wrote letters to the superintendent’s office explaining their discontent with the department and 
demanded that actions must be taken by him to control the police force. They must stop the 
beating of the city’s black citizens. The arguments presented by the NAACP were that if black 
officers had been present at the time of the arrests there would have been no use of unnecessary 
force against the black citizens.
125
 Watters responded saying that all offences by NOPD officers 
would be fully investigated and that if the mistreatment continued, the NAACP should direct 
their complaints to the District Attorney. Watters resigned from office two days after sending the 
letter. In 1949, after a civil lawsuit had been filed by Carlton Pecot, one of the individuals who 
had passed the police test and was denied a job, against the NOPD for discriminating against 
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blacks in the hiring process, Mayor Morrison urged the new police superintendent, Joseph 
Scheuring, to appoint some black police officers to the force.
126
  
In 1950, Pecot and John Raphael were the first two black police officers to be appointed 
to the NOPD in the 20
th
 century. Many restrictions were put on these two officers that made their 
job difficult and completely different than most of the police force.  A 1959 New York Times 
article described the role of the black officers in the NOPD. Black patrolmen were confined to 
patrolling black neighborhoods and dealt with all investigations that went on in those areas. They 
were also not allowed to arrest white citizens unless they were with a white officer.
127
 The small 
numbers of black officers were essentially useless outside their jurisdictions to stop blacks from 
being assaulted by whites. Another issue that also had to be addressed along with the lack of 
black officers in the police force was the poor quality education being given to young blacks in 
New Orleans. Without a good school system to nurture the minds of young blacks, there is little 
hope of them getting jobs in the police force or in any other more specialized field.  
Police brutality was overlooked in many cases due to the white power structure in the 
New Orleans Police Department. Even as the NOPD began to recruit more black members 
throughout the 1950s, there was no indication that the brutality practiced in the past was going to 
end. Black children were being arrested for playing on unoccupied designated white 
playgrounds, black pedestrians were randomly shot at in the street, and black women were raped 
by white police officers.
128
 In the case of one woman, she was raped by a white police officer 
who was being watched by two other white officers. The young woman reported the officers and 
they were arrested. When they went to trial, there was an all white jury that did not believe the 
woman’s story and all three officers were acquitted.129 Police officers routinely made up stories 
about how blacks attacked them and they were forced to defend themselves in a brutal manner. 
Many arrests were conducted by the whites on the police force following this strategy as an 
example. The black community responded with the creation of the Committee to Prevent Police 
Brutality to Negro Citizens.
130
 The Committee met with Mayor Morrison, the district attorney 
and the councilmen who was the delegate for the district where the beatings took place. The 
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brutality by officers was denied by the city leaders when the citizens on the Committee called for 
an investigation. The Committee realized they were complaining to deaf ears and that a more 
radical style of protest would be necessary to get the message across that police brutality would 
not be tolerated. The 1960’s would bring about this new radicalism in the black community.131  
Part of the radicalism was brought on by the gentrification of neighborhoods. Hurricane 
Betsy ripped through the city in 1965, dumping inches of rain and flooding the overwhelmed 
levees. Areas of the city, like the Ninth Ward began to empty of its white inhabitants and poor 
blacks began to move in.
132
 The Army Corps of Engineers started to play a much more active 
role in protecting the city and providing the illusion of safety to the citizens of the New 
Orleans.
133
 The schools that were built in the Ninth Ward for white children no longer received 
similar funding for the black students that now occupied them. 
 Black New Orleanians were subjected to poorly equipped schools around the city due 
mainly to overcrowding and lack of funding from the city throughout the early parts of the 
century. In the 1920s, the Orleans Parish School Board who oversaw the school district in the 
Ninth Ward instated a “platoon system.” This system had the student’s only going to school for a 
half day so that the teachers could teach a new group of students during the second half of the 
day.
134
 While WWII was a blessing for those searching for jobs, it wreaked havoc on the 
infrastructure of the city, i.e. the schools and housing. Thousands moved into the city when the 
war started in search of jobs. There were very few housing options in the city where the migrants 
could relocate to so the New Orleans city government decided to build low income housing 
projects in the marsh, an area now known as the Upper Ninth Ward.
135
 These projects were 
overflowing with new citizens which created overcrowding in the school system. Not only were 
the schools overcrowded but they were unfit for human use as a school board member stated 
after touring one of the facilities. 
136
 There was no space for the children in the classrooms and 
resources such as books, school supplies, and the buildings were over used and quickly became 
dilapidated.
137
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In 1948, a dock worker named Wilfred Aubert Jr., grew tired of his children getting an 
inadequate education and decided to file a law suit against the school board for discriminating 
against black children. He approached lawyer A.P. Tureaud who took the issue up with the 
school board. Tureaud warned them that if they did not improve the conditions in the black 
schools that he would follow through with the law suit that had been purposed by Aubert. The all 
white school board said that they would devote a majority of their funds and time into making 
the black schools more suitable. Tureaud did not believe the school board and filed the suit under 
the name Rosana Aubert v. Orleans Parish School Board.
138
 This case was filed under the 
premise that the actions of the school board were going against the ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson 
which stipulated that it was legal for whites and blacks to be segregated but they must have all 
the same amenities at their disposal.
139
 This was clearly not the case in the Ninth Ward. The 
education was sub-par and insufficient for the needs of New Orleans’ black population. The only 
reason that this case was not brought to the Supreme Court was because Brown v. Board of 
Education was deemed a more solid case for NAACP to show support for.
140
 
 The 1960s was not just an era of change for blacks in New Orleans but for the whole 
black American population. The movements that came out of the 1960s were geared towards 
changing the social and political structure of the United States to include the black populace as 
equals to the country’s white citizens. With passage of Brown v. Board of Education, schools 
slowly started integrating throughout the United States. It took four years for the first schools in 
New Orleans to desegregate but on November 14, 1960 four young black girls started their first 
days of school in an integrated environment, the most famous of which was Ruby Bridges.   
Ruby was the only black student attending William Frantz Public School that November 
and was constantly under the guard of U.S. Marshals who were assigned to make sure no harm 
came to her.
141
 Large crowds showed up to protest the integration of the schools, William Frantz 
and John McDonough No. 19, and the NOPD did a good job of upholding the law and not letting 
the mob turn violent.
142
 The demographics of this mob were completely new to the New Orleans 
history of violence. This group of protestors was shockingly comprised of almost all women as 
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Time Magazine reported.
143
 A local newspaper quoted a white mother saying, “They ought to 
take Judge Wright [The judge who ordered New Orleans schools be integrated] out and hang him 
by his toes.”144  According to the article, state troopers also tried to present the principal of 
Frantz Public School with legislative documents to shut down the school for the day but the 
school administrator refused.
145
 The Louisiana State legislature was up in arms about the matter 
as well. Many representatives said that they would “rather go to jail then see the schools 
integrated.”146 The polices response of keeping the crowd in control was of the last harmonious 
visions a lot of blacks would see from the New Orleans police for some time.  
Figure 4.   
147
               Figure 5.   
148
 
(Bridges entering William Frantz Public School)              (Mothers of former students protesting Ruby’s  presence) 
One of the organizations spearheading the civil right movement was called the Congress 
of Racial Equality (CORE) and they instituted a plan of “direct action” all over the southern 
United States. This plan non-violently brought the plight of black citizens to the door step of 
white America. Direct action employed strategies like sit-ins at restaurants and convenience 
stores where blacks were not allowed to patronize and boycotted businesses or institutions that 
segregated against blacks. This radicalism shown by the black community scared and infuriated 
many whites. The combination of the integrating of the schools and the more proactive stance by 
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the city’s black population made whites want to move out of the city, contributing to white 
flight.
149
 
 In the early stages of integrating the schools, many whites removed their children from 
classes until they could find a new school that was more exclusive and did not allow blacks such 
as private schools. In some cases, those parents who took their children out of the schools went 
and vehemently lobbied other white families do the same by harassing them as they walked their 
children into the schools. An example of the favor police showed to whites; the police let this 
behavior from the whites persist but when a black person from New Orleans peacefully 
participated in a sit-in, they would be subjected to the full, violent force of the law.
150
 The 
NAACP and CORE continued sponsoring peaceful sit-ins and helping those who were still being 
brutalized by the NOPD while the police sustained their practices of arresting and, when 
possible, manhandling black citizens for breaking minor laws such as driving with a broken head 
light or being congregated in the street without a parade permit. As the Black Panther Party 
declared, an individual can only take so much abuse before they decided to fight back. 
 The Black Panther Party (BPP) was founded on the tenants of the black community 
coming together and embracing their black identity. They wanted good shelter, education, and 
opportunity for blacks to thrive, along with full employment and healthcare for blacks and the 
oppressed in the U.S. The BPP also had a special focus on ending police brutality nationwide 
that blacks suffered under the white majority police forces.
151
 The BPP named these goals The 
Ten Point Plan. One of the ways the BPP carried out their objective of putting an end to police 
brutality and violence against blacks in general was by openly exercising their right to bear arms 
as written in the United States Constitution. The intimidation factor created by black private 
citizens carrying guns scared the police officers and made them think twice before assaulting a 
black person.  The Panthers governed the organization based off these covenants and locally 
focused on the issues that were of greatest concern to the black population they were serving.
152
 
 The BPP in New Orleans tried to serve the community using both violent and non-violent 
strategies. It set up breakfast programs for hungry children before school, opened free sickle-cell 
screening facilities, taught classes on self-determination, and the Panthers made it clear to drug 
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dealers that they would not be allowed to peddle their product around neighborhoods with lots of 
black children. The BPP saw drugs as a substance keeping blacks oppressed. It took their money 
and inhibited their true mental capacity.
153
 The community reaped many benefits from the 
presence of the Panthers but the white power structure did not like what the BPP was doing. One 
former Panther, Malik Rahim, thought that the New Orleans city government did not like the 
Panthers because of the effect they had on municipal funding. The federal government awards 
funding to cities based on the crime and poverty rate of a city. The Panthers goal was to 
eliminate both in the black community and this would have resulted in less funding for the local 
government.
154
 The BPP made their headquarters in the locality of Desire, New Orleans north of 
the French Quarter and on the waterfront along the Mississippi River. These were areas where 
many black residents lived in housing projects so they set up in a house on Piety Street and 
Apartment A of Desire Project House #3315.
155
 These buildings were the center of operation for 
the Panthers and were the ground zero sites for two massive confrontations between the NOPD 
and the BPP. As described in Leonard Moore’s book, Black Rage in New Orleans, Desire was 
one of the youngest, most dangerous, and poverty stricken areas of New Orleans. “Desire was a 
time bomb waiting to explode.” 156 
 On September 15, 1970 the NOPD sent around one hundred police officers to raid the 
offices of the BPP on Piety Street who had been served eviction papers a few months prior but 
did not comply. When the officers arrived in armored vehicles the BPP members had barricaded 
themselves into the house. The police opened fire on the house that contained 14 BPP members. 
The reports of Malik Rahim, who was in the house, stated that the police officers fired on the 
house with high powered rifles and pistols for close to 20 minutes before ceasing fire. All 
fourteen occupants were arrested and surprisingly unscathed.
157
  The NOPD forensics teams 
found 887 shell rounds at the scene.
158
 In October the Panthers made 3315 their headquarters and 
on November 19, 1970 the police showed up to evict them again. This time 250 officers were 
deployed to the scene to arrest all those in the building.
159
 When the black community who lived 
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in the projects saw what was going to happen, thousands of them took to the streets to stand in 
front of the building, effectively stopping the police from conducting their raid that day.
160
 Seven 
days later, police officers disguised as priests and postal workers raided the building arresting six 
of the Panthers on suspicion of attempted murder and firearms violations.
161
 The story of these 
police raids alludes to the overzealous nature of the NOPD in all acts of restricting the black 
population. The black population of New Orleans had to think more about defending themselves 
as the police department began to do less and less to protect and serve their community.  
 
Figure 6. 
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(Officers attempting to get through neighborhood civilians to raid the Black Panther Party 
headquarters) 
                          
Figure 7. 
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(Officers moving in behind the “war wagon” to arrest Black Panther Party members in Desire 
Projects) 
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With the police department not making the necessary efforts in black communities, 
individuals joined “watchdog” groups like the Soul Patrol to police their own neighborhoods.164 
This group of young black males threatened to beat up anyone they saw doing wrong in their 
neighborhoods, black or white. Many black community members did not approve of the Soul 
Patrol and wanted the police to stop this radical group from imposing its own law and order on 
the public.
165
  A more focused group also came out of necessity of more protection of black 
citizens. The Black Organization of Police (BOP) was created in 1973 to try to combat the acts 
of police brutality occurring in New Orleans, provide greater protection for black neighborhoods, 
improve relations between black citizens and the police, and encourage more blacks to join the 
force.
166
 This group knew that public relations would be the best way to reach the black 
community and performing their jobs to the best of their ability and serving greater numbers in 
the black community was the best place to start. 
 The BOP’s efforts did not inspire the community to apply to be one of NOPD’s finest. 
The statistics of police brutality and homicides committed by the NOPD against blacks was a 
large reason for this. “Between 1974 and 1975, the NOPD continued to kill black civilians at a 
higher rate than any other police department in the country.”167 Blacks in the city at that time 
were statistically more violent than other African Americans around the United States. New 
Orleans had one of the highest rates of black on black violence in the country.
168
  This can 
largely be attributed to the conditions that the black population was living in. It was everything 
that the BPP and the NAACP were fighting against. They did not have proper education systems 
set up for blacks to thrive in. Where there was a police force, it was set up as a means of 
oppression and not to protect the people. These issues continue to persist today as it will be 
shown in the next chapter.  
 From the beginning of the 20
th
 century, New Orleans truly began to be defined as a 
troubled city in the United States. From boasting one of the highest crime rates and the highest 
rates of police corruption and assaults to enduring being a city with deeply-seated racist 
tendencies, the black population found itself trying to escape the discrimination by any means 
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necessary. For some, this meant literally fleeing the city in search of work and a less racist 
climate elsewhere in the United States. For others, it meant that the black citizens of the city had 
to join up together and make it a better place to live.  The NAACP and the Black Panther Party 
played important roles in organizing the black people of New Orleans to better their lives 
through numerous programs and initiatives set in place. A black person becoming a first class 
citizen in the Big Easy is a hard thing to overcome and as the next chapter will show, it has yet to 
be accomplished. 
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Chapter 4: Reformation in the NOPD, Environmental Injustice, and Hurricane Katrina 
The previous chapters have discussed the neglect and mistreatment of the black citizens 
in New Orleans. This chapter will focus on the same issues that have been troubling the Big 
Easy, from the 1980s on. These factors have made it one of the least desirable cities in the United 
States to live in, especially for blacks. There are four elements that will be focused on in this 
chapter. First is the continued police brutality and corruption in the justice system that ran 
rampant since the early 20
th
 century. This era is when blacks being to obtain real positions of 
power in New Orleans. The first black mayor and police chiefs in the city were elected and 
promoted into their positions and made respectable efforts to improve the life of blacks in the 
city without interrupting the status quo. Second is gang life that sprouted and flourished in New 
Orleans and surrounding parishes. Gangs had a different dynamic in New Orleans than they have 
in most of the country. New Orleans gangs were almost exclusively local, meaning that they 
have no affiliation with national gangs like the Bloods, the Crypts, or MS13.
169
  Third, a culture 
of poverty was pervasive in the poor black neighborhoods of New Orleans. Insufficient facilities 
and poor upkeep of the neighborhoods on the city’s part played a role in maintaining the poverty 
levels in these communities. Finally, this chapter will discuss the environmental factors that 
plagued the city. Areas of New Orleans predominantly black neighborhoods that were built on 
former garbage dumps were declared Superfund sites and caused high cancer rates in those areas. 
The mismanagement on the barriers protecting the city led to the catastrophic failure of the 
levees when Hurricane Katrina struck. Ironically, the defenses that were put in place by the 
government to protect the city helped destroy the natural defenses that were already in place. 
Hurricane Katrina epitomized a breakdown in the system that negatively affected the lives of all 
New Orleanians, particularly the poorest black population.  
 Police brutality and corruption stand at the forefront of black citizens’ minds when they 
are looking for protection. The effectiveness of the police force to prevent crimes from 
happening plays a major role in this era. The black community felt as though they had caught a 
break when the first black mayor was elected in 1977. Ernest (Dutch) Morial made history that 
day turning out the largest number of black voters in a mayoral election to date.
170
 Mayor Morial 
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would be fighting an uphill battle to reform the Police Department.
171
 The former New Orleans 
judge stood in an excellent position to turn around the history of police brutality in the city and 
made great efforts to do so. Morial wanted branches of the local government to be held 
accountable for all their actions so he pushed for the creation of the Office of Municipal 
Investigation (OMI) in 1979. This commission was made up of civil servants who were charged 
with investigating acts of malfeasance in the local government and Police Department to end the 
police misconduct in New Orleans.
172
 They were supposed to fill the gaps that internal 
investigations could not. Despite a large backing from the black community, OMI was shut down 
because of a lack of police support.
173
 The group was seen as anti-police by the white officers of 
the NOPD and combined with a lack of publicly releasing files on their effectiveness; the OMI 
did not receive the funding to continue operations.
174
 The checks and balances created by OMI 
seemed to deter many officers from abusing their power, but it was not able to stop them all.  
 An issue that gained national attention in 1980 was the killing of three black males and 
one black female by NOPD officers. Two of the men killed were suspects in the case of a cop 
killing. Those killed were shot to death by officers who were investigating the killing of white 
police officer Gregory Neuport in a New Orleans housing project. A mob of white police officers 
stormed a black area of town killing the four individuals and injuring 50 others.
175
 Seven of the 
fourteen officers involved in the beatings and killings were brought up on criminal charges.
176
 
This brought civil rights groups in New Orleans together to push the mayor to do more about the 
inappropriate actions of the police in predominately black neighborhoods.  
In 1984, Morial took further steps toward a stronger anti-brutality, more proactive 
Department when he promoted the first black police officer, Warren Woodfork, to be the city’s 
police chief. Woodfork had been on the NOPD for twenty years and knew the history of a black 
officer’s role in the police department that has been discussed in the previous chapters. He 
wanted to make the police an element of the New Orleans infrastructure that all citizens could 
trust once again. Unfortunately, he was limited by economic factors from increasing the number 
of officers on the streets to ensure the safety of all citizens. At that time New Orleans had the 
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fourth highest homicide rate in the United States.
177
 According to the National Criminal Justice 
Reference Service, in 1985, out of the 156 homicides, 79.5% of homicide victims in New 
Orleans were black.
178
 This statistic shows a large discrepancy in the population being affected 
by the crime rates. The not so hidden message is that the black community was living in fear and 
it was up to the new police chief to make them feel safe.  
179
    
180
 
(Figure 8. Mayor Ernest “Dutch” Morial)   (Figure 9. Police Superintendent Warren Woodfork) 
 
Budget cuts were a result of whites moving out of the city into the neighboring to Slidell 
and St. Tammany cost the New Orleans Police Department the employment of almost 200 
officers between 1985 and 1987. This was because of the effect that black communities had on 
property taxes. When neighborhood demographics switched from being majority white to 
majority black, statistics say that the property taxes drop.
181
 This would negatively affect the 
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municipal funding to all facets of the infrastructure in the neighborhood from the schools to the 
roads.  
As Moore talks about in his book Black Rage in New Orleans, there was very little that 
could be done in terms of stopping crimes from being committed in the three most dangerous 
predominantly black housing projects. In the Desire, St. Thomas, and Fischer projects, the black 
occupants lived in such close quarters with such large numbers that it would be nearly 
impossible to police with a full-staffed police force.
182
 Woodfork wanted to improve conditions 
in those crime ridden areas but the greater population wanted the manpower of the police force 
that was available to be used in the areas of the city that attracted business to New Orleans like 
the French Quarter. A larger police presence was sought in the high crime areas, but as a New 
Orleans citizen, and president of the local chapter of the NAACP, Shirley B. Porter said to the 
New York Times, “We can’t have the police acting as arresting officers, lawyers, prosecutors, 
judge and jury, and deny people all of their civil rights.”183 Porter’s statement brings up the 
tactics that officers in the NOPD use to apprehend suspects and whether they are truly necessary.  
Unfortunately for New Orleans, as drug use and violent crime began to spike around the 
city in the 80s and 90s, the officers did not demonstrate their power to make the city safer. 
Between 1970 and 1995, the homicide rate in New Orleans skyrocketed 329 percent making it 
one of the most dangerous cities and earning the title “Murder Capital of the United States.184 
That astounding statistic reflects poorly on the Department. Being undermanned and 
inadequately funded caused gaps in the police’s effectiveness. As special FBI agent Jim 
Bernazzani was quoted saying, “When a community feels the judicial system has failed, a second 
system kicks in, and killings beget killings beget killings.”185 One citizen’s critique of the NOPD 
was that they were only present when something was going wrong. They never saw them just 
patrolling neighborhoods making sure everything was safe.
186
 This style of policing changes the 
way people think about their police force. If officers are only around when there is a crime being 
committed, that creates a negative association with seeing police. However, in highly policed 
areas, like the French Quarter for example, where police are always present, it gives the illusion 
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of safety to those in the area because they are always present.
187
 If more focus was put on having 
police put in the poor black neighborhoods and projects, it could have changed the way people 
saw and acted toward the police.  
A study conducted in 2004 by Susan Howell, Huey Perry and Matthew Vile researched 
the differences between approval ratings of police in cities known as mostly black versus cities 
with a majority white population. Their research shows that blacks have negative opinions of the 
police due to the nature of their encounters. They cite the Bureau of Justice saying that “African 
Americans and Hispanics were more likely to experience a threat of force, or the actual use of 
force, by the police as a result of contact with the police.”188 They make the argument that it is 
because crime rates are higher in black neighborhoods that police are overly aggressive.
189
 There 
is no middle ground between over-policing and under-policing.
190
 This can certainly be applied 
in the context of New Orleans. The NOPD are either not present, causing extremely high rates of 
crime, or they are being overly aggressive and causing harm to the black community that they 
are supposed to be protecting. This can cause a bad cycle of violence between the community 
and police. The blacks who are involved in crime would respond more aggressively to a police 
presence because they are used to living in an uncontrolled environment, which in turn causes 
the police to respond in a harsher manner. The overall outcome of the study was actually to find 
that whites have a more staunchly negative opinion of the police in black cities when they are 
victimized by a black person because they feel that they should have been better protected. Black 
citizens feel the same oppression from police no matter whether the city is classified as black or 
white and are not as outwardly negative about their encounter.
191
 
Many of the crimes that were causing epidemic crime rates in New Orleans could be 
attributed to the expansion and development of drug use and trade in the city. Local gangs were 
the main pushers of drugs in the city. Crack cocaine hit the drug market hard in the 1980s.
192
 
This highly addictive drug was seen being used from coast to coast in the United States and New 
Orleans was no exception. The crack was cheap which made it appealing to those using drugs in 
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the predominantly black neighborhoods and projects. New Orleans did not have a big narcotics 
unit but they were specially trained in how to deal with drug dealers and drug related arrests. 
Dealing predominantly with drug busts in the projects, officers were taught to “stick and 
move.”193 This strategy was a focus on arresting the suspect quickly and getting out of the area as 
fast as possible. With all the negativity felt towards police in these neighborhoods, some of the 
black citizens tried to make the officers jobs harder by attempting to fight officers who were 
arresting suspects. This “stick and move” strategy, along with not retaliating against the citizens 
trying to impede officers, helped to cut down on incidents of the police having to use excessive 
force against innocent citizens.
194
 
As drugs became more pervasive in society, they also filtered their way into the Police 
Department. There were always drugs going in and out of police stations in New Orleans with 
drug related arrests being made which made them easily available for officers to get their hands 
on. In 1994, the FBI set up faux drug running rings and employed corrupt NOPD officers as 
security for the drug warehouses they set up. According to a 1994 New York Times article, “the 
nine officers accepted more than $97,000 in bribes and protected a sham drug trafficking 
ring.”195 The FBI confiscated a total of 286 pounds of cocaine from the arrested officers.196 The 
article also alleges that as many as 20 other officers could have been indicted if the case had been 
allowed to run its course.
197
 This crackdown by the FBI was allowed by the new Superintendent 
of Police Richard Pennington. The title of a 1996 report perfectly describes the state of the 
NOPD at the point when Pennington took over. The title is as follows, “The nes Line: Richard 
Pennington, the newest chief of police in New Orleans, has to deal with organized drug rings, 
execution-style murderers, bank robbers and rapists. And that's just the cops.”198 The 
Pennington era was yet again supposed to mark the start of stricter reform in the New Orleans 
Police Department.  
One incident that made national news which also highlights the situation that Pennington 
was entering into was the story of Antoinette Frank. Frank was a young member of the New 
Orleans Police Department that shot and killed a fellow officer who was moonlighting as a 
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security guard at a Vietnamese restaurant. Along with two accomplices, Frank robbed the 
restaurant and executed both of the Vietnamese owners before killing officer Ronald Williams 
II.
199
 According to a New York Times article, Frank used to work at the restaurant and was 
considered to be a close friend of both the owners and officer Williams.
200
 Frank was one of four 
officers in the NOPD who were arrested for murder that year and one of 50 who were convicted 
of felonies between 1993 and 1996. Some of the other felony convictions committed in this time 
period consisted of bank robbery and several counts of rape.
201
 
Pennington wanted to do more than just improve the Department itself; he wanted 
citizens to feel involved with their safety. He wanted to increase the amount of citizen patrols 
that walked the streets of New Orleans along with increasing the number of foot patrol officers. 
According to an interview done with the New York Times he planned on building a new sub-
station in the Lower Ninth Ward, a predominantly black neighborhood and focusing a majority 
of his resources on the other high crime neighborhoods like the parishes of “Desire, Florida, and 
B.W. Cooper – the site of 26 percent of the city’s 421 homicides last year [1994].”202 Getting rid 
of the stigma of New Orleans being the “homicide capital in America in 1992 and 1994” and 
“also [ranking] near the top of brutality complaints since 1980,”203 was Pennington’s fated duty. 
Pennington was unsuccessful in his attempts and the failures of the police force resulted in the 
breakdown of civil society in New Orleans during the 1980s and 1990s allowing drug dealers 
and local gangs to take over the streets in the absence of police. Paired with a culture of poverty 
being bred amongst the black population in the city, either a miracle or complete destruction was 
needed to aid the new Superintendent in his goal.  
 A culture of poverty had overtaken the poor black neighborhoods in New Orleans. Oscar 
Lewis, the man who coined the term “culture of poverty”204 used it to describe a class that could 
not elevate out of the dregs of society. In his research in Mexico he found that in some cases, it 
was a not for lack of trying that individuals could not escape the lowest echelons of economic 
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stability. Lewis found that a large part of whether this group was able to rise out of poverty was 
related to their government’s responsiveness to their pleas for help. He believes that there is a 
direct correlation between the parents living in poverty and the children remaining in a state of 
poverty when they become adults.
205
 As it relates to New Orleans, a culture of poverty seemed to 
have developed due to the poor education system in predominantly black neighborhoods, an 
oppressive police force, and a lack of government involvement that will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 Environmental hazards have plagued New Orleans since it foundation, as alluded to in 
the previous chapters, but were especially detrimental to the black population beginning in the 
late 20
th
 century. Craig Colten writes an illuminating piece on the Superfund sites in New 
Orleans that is a result of garbage dumps being covered and then built upon for low income 
families. Colten shows an extreme demographic change in New Orleans from a majority white to 
majority black population between the 1950s and 1990s.
206
 This growth in the black population 
resulted in a need for more public housing. The place the federal government chose impinged on 
was a former landfill that had been closed since the 1970s. Colten cites that between 1950 and 
1980, the population living near the former dump, what is now known as the Ninth Ward went 
from 50 percent black to 99 percent black occupants.
207
  
With the growing black population in the Ninth Ward and Agriculture Street area, new 
infrastructure had to be built to keep up with the spike in residents. The Orleans Parish School 
Board wanted to build a new school to support the community but ran into a road block when 
they found out that the area where they intended to build it, which was very close in proximity to 
old Agriculture Street dump, tested very highly for toxins in the soil. With pushing from the local 
black community who thought that the Board was trying to avoid building the school for them, 
the School Board started construction in 1986.
208
 The residents of the parish did not know the 
long lasting effect that the toxic soil could have on their children or themselves. “Tests 
conducted by the Louisiana Environmental Action Network found soil near the [former] dump to 
contain 13 times the EPA standard for arsenic and high levels of carcinogens benzopyrene, 
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barium, chromium, lead, benzene, and toluene.”209 As Dr. Beverly Wright, founder of the Deep 
South Center of Environmental Justice, explains, “[the] landfill was shut down and the housing 
was built. Thirty years later, we find out it’s a Superfund site – that people there have 35 percent 
breast cancer rate. Children are sick and many people have died from living on top of a 
landfill.”210 The site was not declared a Superfund site until December 16, 1994211, almost 20 
years after the Superfund Act was put in place by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
The majority of black citizens in this neighborhood did not receive what was promised to 
them under the Superfund Act. There was a split in the community as Colten describes the 
situation; some of the community wanted the city to buyout their properties at full price and 
others wanted the site to be cleaned up so they could continue living there.
212
 Both fell under 
provisions of the Superfund but the lack of unity amongst the residents to decide which course of 
action should be taken left them vulnerable to the federal government making their own decision. 
At first the EPA said that they would follow remediation protocols to clean up the site and make 
it safe for habitation once more. Due to the protests of some citizens, they compromised and said 
that those who wished to relocate would be reimbursed for their property and the remediation 
plans would continue forward. The city of New Orleans, the responsible party in this situation, 
did not have the funds to relocate the citizens so they took the middle ground on the issue. The 
mayor, Ray Nagin, announced that he wanted to see those negatively affected to get what they 
deserve but that the money cannot come from the city’s budget.213 The EPA footed the $20 
million dollar bill and did a poor job remediating the area because they did not want to interfere 
with the underground infrastructure already in place.
214
 This particular grievance of the black 
community in the Ninth Ward was fairly localized. The issues with drinking water in the city and 
the communities between Baton Rouge and New Orleans became a much larger problem. 
The stretch of the Mississippi River that ran between Baton Rouge and New Orleans was 
aptly given the name “Cancer Alley.” In 1993, there were more than 100 toxic sites along the 
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Mississippi river and doctors began to research the correlation between the industrial waste 
outlets and the increase in cancer rates among the black communities that lived on this part of the 
river.
215
 As of 1999, there were between 175 and 375 heavy industrial plants along the 
Mississippi River on this stretch of land.
216
 In the early to mid-20
th
 century, the Mississippi River 
was used as a way to dispose of the waste communities made. Everything from garbage to bio-
hazard material was thrown into the River without any regard for those living on its banks or 
those drinking the water downstream.
217
 Petrochemical plants began to be built along the 
Mississippi in the 1940s between Baton Rouge and New Orleans because of the ease of access to 
the Gulf of Mexico. As big oil companies began to set up shop along the Mississippi they were 
required to apply for discharge permits that meant that they had to turn in detailed reports to the 
Stream Control Commission (SCC) of what chemicals and possible toxins they were pumping 
into the River.
218
 This commission did not keep track or enforce the companies turning in the 
reports and negligently allowed the dumping of unknown amounts of harmful chemicals into the 
River. As Colten states, “The SCC’s cooperative posture did little to discourage use of the 
Mississippi River as a waste sink.”219  
After the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was formed in 1970, they had the 
opportunity to take a more proactive stance to protect the waterway from pollution that was 
pouring in from both industrial and municipal sources. They did not. In 1992, the Southern 
Organizing Committee for Economic and Social Justice met to discuss their concerns about the 
EPA’s failures in the South.  
“The EPA came under fire for: (1) allowing poisonous industries to locate and 
hazardous wastes to be disproportionately located in people of color communities 
and (2) for having different cleanup standards for people of color communities 
than for white communities…African American communities are the United 
States primary dumping grounds for hazardous and radioactive wastes and for 
sitting poisonous industries.”220  
This quote reflects both areas of the black population talked about in this section; the black 
population in New Orleans proper and those living along the River between Baton Rouge and 
New Orleans who received their potable water from the polluted Mississippi River. All the 
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pollution in and under black neighborhoods would become a bigger problem in 2005 with the 
storm that would inundate 80 percent of the city leaving all the pollutants to rise out of the 
ground and rest on the streets of the city. 
The history of protecting the city must be explained before the story of the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina that devastated New Orleans is told. The city has had to deal with issues of 
flooding since it was founded by the French in the early 18
th
 century. As Adam Cohen explains 
in his article in The New York Times, “The French explorer who founded the city was so 
enraptured by this crescent-shaped stretch of the lower Mississippi that he ignored many 
naysayers.”221 They tried to explain that the constant flooding would not sustain a well structured 
city. This is a similar comment that was echoed in Chapter One of this piece. The Army Corps of 
Engineers took over the flood protection of the city in 1879. Before that, the levees that were 
built up as barriers to protect against the Mississippi flooding were marginally funded by New 
Orleans but mainly left up to the individual landowner who lived on the river.
222
 Since then, 
again with small amounts of funding from the municipal government and federal funds, the 
Corps has tried to protect the city by building levees taller and stronger every time they are 
overrun by floods. When Hurricane Betsy struck the city in 1965, 18 parishes were flooded, 72 
people were killed, and about 17,600 New Orleans citizens were injured.
223
 The Corps response 
was again to build the levees and flood walls higher and stronger. The infrastructure protecting 
New Orleans is only drastically improved when it has been over ridden, a seemingly ineffective 
strategy.  
There is constant maintenance that must be done to keep water from flooding the city. 
The Corp and the city’s Sewerage and Water Board had to build canals to remove flood waters 
from the city and deposit them in Lake Pontchartrain.
224
 The problem with the canals is that the 
land that the city is built on was formerly a marsh, which has higher water content than most soil. 
Every time it rains the soil absorbs all of it but when it is drained, the unsaturated soil 
compresses easily under the pressure exerted on it by the weight of the city. The pumps in these 
canals are meant to pump rain water out but also to remove the water that it being pressed out of 
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the ground by the pressure of the city. When water is removed from the soil under the city, the 
deeper the city sinks below sea level, which in turn makes it more susceptible to flooding.
225
  
Along with the levees protecting the city, there is also the natural barrier from the Gulf of 
Mexico formed by marshy freshwater wetlands. These are the same wetlands that the city was 
built on three centuries ago. Freshwater wetlands are home to plants like marsh grasses that can 
help buffer storm surges and slow wave speeds significantly before they hit the city.
226
 Since the 
1960s, the Army Corp of Engineers has conducted a significant amount of dredging on the 
Mississippi River to clear out the sediments collected that could impede boat traffic from going 
up river. These sediments formerly would have deposited at the base of the River to create 
barrier islands that could slow storm surges.
227
 The dredging has also caused a direct flow of salt 
water to travel up the Mississippi and into the marshes that cannot grow if exposed to copious 
amounts of salt water. Mark Fischetti estimated in 2001 that annually, about 25 to 30 square 
miles of wetlands disappear, that is about an acre every 24 minutes.
228
 Luckily, since Katrina, the 
Corps has made it a priority to restore this natural barrier and is striving to make it a healthy 
freshwater marsh once again. 
A critical component that makes the travesty of Katrina even more devastating is that the 
Corps and the city leaders knew that they were not prepared to protect against a storm like 
Katrina. Terry Tullier, the head of the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness was 
quoted in 2002 saying, “When I do presentations, I start by saying ‘when the Big One comes, 
many of you will die…’”229 The projections for the “Big One” were not exactly accurate as they 
were predicting that it would take a Category 4-5 storm to breach the levees on the Mississippi 
and Lake Pontchartrain but it only took a Category 3 hurricane. The death toll estimates if this 
perfect storm hit flooding this sinking city were tens of thousands dead. Even if a total 
evacuation of the city was called for, there is a population of around 100,000 residents of New 
Orleans that did not own cars, mainly the poor and black people. Tullier was echoing remarks by 
Mayor Walter Maestri who spent Hurricane Allison in a bunker deploying emergency services 
from there. Allison dumped 5 inches of rain of the city and caused massive problems for 
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emergency personnel. Maestri said, “Even though we have a plan for it, I don’t even want to 
think about the loss of a life a huge hurricane would cause [to New Orleans].”230 This loss of life 
that he was referring to and a massive loss of property were felt by all citizens of New Orleans 
but particularly in the black community when Katrina hit.  
Of those 100,000 immobilized by a lack of transportation out of New Orleans, many of 
them were the poor, black residents in Orleans parish. Hurricane Katrina’s impact served the 
purpose of highlighting the inequalities that are still prevalent to the African Americans in New 
Orleans. The residents of New Orleans East and the Lower Ninth Ward (named this because it 
sits further below sea level than the section that was closer to the levees) were predominantly 
black. In 2000, New Orleans East was 86 percent black,
231
 the Lower Ninth Ward was 98 percent 
black, and Gentilly was also around 98 percent black.
232
 These were three of the neighborhoods 
that were inundated with the most water from Hurricane Katrina.
233
 Patrick Sharkey, a professor 
at Harvard University, conducted a study of the individuals who died in the storm and found that 
the majority of them were black and that they were the most affected racial group in terms of 
death toll.
234
 He concludes that due to racial segregation of neighborhoods in New Orleans that 
have slowly divided over the centuries, that a large majority of the black population lives in areas 
that are prone to natural disasters.
235
 This idea was mirrored by the blacks who were most 
affected was also shown in the evacuees present at the New Orleans Super Dome, which housed 
almost 30,000 New Orleans residents after the storm. They were poor and majority black citizens 
that were unable to evacuate because they did not have nor were they offered the means to do 
so.
236
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The dichotomy of race relations in New Orleans was portrayed in two photographs that 
Associated Press took in wreckage of Katrina. The associated press published two pictures taken 
from a helicopter when covering the devastation of Katrina. One was of a young black male 
carrying a plastic bag full of unknown items and a case of soda and the other picture was of two 
white survivors with backpacks on carrying food.
237
 The two captions to the photo read very 
differently despite the similarity in the scenes. The black male was described as having “looted 
the food” and the white couple “found the food.”238 These are two telling images because they 
reflect the white demographics feeling towards black community in New Orleans. The situation 
could be reversed and the whites could be the looters and the black youth found the food or they 
could all be looters. However, based solely on bias shown by the photographer of these pictures, 
the black male was called a looter, placing him in the position of being assumed a criminal 
because of the color of his skin. 
Figure 10.
239
      Figure 11. 
240
 
            (Figure 10 shows the black youth “looting”)     (Figure 11 shows a couple “finding food) 
An outcry from the national black community over the slow response of the United States 
government to send aid to New Orleans prompted racial debates over whether the racial makeup 
of the city was the reason for the lackadaisical response. Media mogul Kanye West openly came 
out on national television and said, “George Bush (the president) doesn’t care about black 
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people,” at a benefit concert for Katrina victims.241 At the time Katrina hit, the city was a 
majority black, about 66 percent of the population fell under that racial distinction.
242
 While all 
of New Orleans was flooded by Katrina, the neighborhoods of Lakeview, St. Bernard’s parish, 
the Lower Ninth Ward, Gentilly, and New Orleans East accumulated the most standing water.  
Figure 12. 
243
 
(Figure 12 shows where in the city there was the flooding and how deep the water was four day 
after Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans.) 
 
Lakeview and St. Bernard’s were predominantly white and the other three were almost 
exclusively black.
244
 Over 1,200 residents in the city died in Katrina and its aftermath. Time 
Magazine explains why the poor black population felt as though they were the most affected by 
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the storm. “While Katrina made victims of just about everyone in New Orleans, poor black 
residents have had the hardest time restoring their lives, with many evacuees still living outside 
the city and others in FEMA trailers, waiting for promised help to arrive.”245 The author 
interviewed the executive director of People’s Institute for Survival and Beyond who explained, 
“Before the storm, poor schools, inadequate health care, low wages, high unemployment and 
substandard housing were the norm for a vast number of New Orleanians, especially poor 
blacks.”246 Due to the conditions that this group was living in before the storm, they did not have 
the means to rebuild the houses that they lived in before or to relocate to another part of the 
country so they were caught living off the government. 
There are counter arguments that attempt to show that the black population was not 
singled out by the government. As stated earlier, the Lakeview district and St. Bernard’s parish 
were white neighborhoods and they shared in some of the worst flooding.
247
 This statistic alone 
shows that there was no intentional discriminating based on the dispersal of the flood waters or 
weakness in the dams. However, as stated, there was an economic difference between these 
neighborhoods and the black areas that flooded. Referring back to the argument about mobility 
of the blacks, these white neighborhoods were able to rebuild if they wanted where the poor 
blacks had to wait for government funding to come in. As of 2011, about half of the population 
of St. Bernard’ returned to living there and only about one quarter of the occupants of the Lower 
Ninth Ward have returned.
248
  
In analyzing the sources, the issue that was being most closely examined by the African 
American population in the United State was not one of looking to blame where the levees broke 
on the government. They were looking at the state of the black population in the city that put 
them at a disadvantage to survive when Hurricane Katrina struck. New Orleans’ struggle to 
maintain social order caused not only the infrastructure in black neighborhoods to fail but also 
the city to be unsuccessful in protecting its citizens. The corruption that ran rampant through the 
police force led to a distrust of police officers in the black population who were also dealing with 
violence imposed on them by the same force. The local government made few strides to improve 
the schooling in these areas which helped a culture of poverty and gang life to take over. Without 
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proper education, it is harder to be gainfully employed and be seen as equal to the whites who 
are receiving a better education. The environmental inequality in the city also emphasized 
disrespect from the local and federal government. The Superfund site was not properly 
remediated and the pollution being consumed by black communities along the Mississippi 
pointed to a lack of concern for this population. Hurricane Katrina was the perfect storm. Its 
overall effect has pointed out to the greater American community that blacks are still being 
treated as second-class citizens with New Orleans as an example. Returning to the quote from the 
introduction, “Sometimes it takes a natural disaster to point out a social disaster.”249 Jim Wallis 
was correct. The plight of the black citizens of New Orleans was noticed after Katrina but it was 
too late for many of them. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was just an example of the 
government trying to rectify the situation it had created. 
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Conclusion 
Over the history of New Orleans, the black population has had to endure being a part of 
the slave society in the southern United States, being segregated against after the Civil War, and 
were made into second class citizens that had little hope of promotion through society. The 
socio-economic status of blacks in the city has been negatively affected by the role colonial, 
federal and local governments have played in structuring New Orleans. This is shown by the 
violence, environmental inequality, and segregation demonstrated by the white ruling class.  
The colonial governments placed blacks from Africa into slavery in the territory and used 
them as free labor to construct the city and area surrounding it. While the Spanish did allow 
slaves to buy their freedom, freed blacks were not afforded the same rights as the European 
population living in New Orleans.  The French treated the slaves savagely and when the territory 
was sold to the United States, the extreme violence persisted in the form of lynchings, prejudicial 
attacks by whites, and police brutality.  Since the United States took control of New Orleans, the 
city has seen race riots and race based attacks make the streets run red with the blood of black 
citizen’s. The city has been home to black power groups that butted heads with the police serving 
to highlight the violence that black civilians had to deal with on a daily basis. The New Orleans 
Police Department’s corruption and violent police style brought national organizing groups like 
the NAACP into the city to conduct peaceful rallies and sit-ins to enact a change in the city 
government. 
Black action in the city propelled New Orleans to the forefront of American news when 
they attempted to desegregate schools. The schools for black children in the city, and nationwide, 
were underfunded and undersupplied. This caused uproar in the black community resulting in the 
legally mandated integration of all public schools in the United States. Ruby Bridges was the 
first black child to attend William Franz Public School, an all-white school. This did not occur 
without the protest of many white citizens. The schools in predominantly black neighborhood of 
New Orleans remained poorly funded as redlining became a common custom of state 
governments. This, combined with white flight, led to a social stratification of neighborhood in 
New Orleans, further segregating the city. The poorest black populations were forced to live in 
the lowest lying parts of the city while the whites lived in the suburbs or in higher areas.  
Environmental inequality was shown in many ways in New Orleans. It was demonstrated 
early on when black communities were blamed for the yellow fever bouts that struck the city 
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from the late 1700s to the early 1900s, but mosquitoes were the main culprit in spreading the 
yellow fever. New Orleans is the lowest lying city in the United States sitting 6 feet below sea 
level. The levee and pumping systems had yet to be perfected and constant flooding of the lower 
lying areas of the city, where mostly blacks lived, coupled with the warm climate made them the 
major source of mosquito spawning grounds. Black neighborhoods were the last to receive 
services from municipal sewerage companies which also helped pervade the image of the black 
citizens living in unsanitary conditions. New Orleans built low income housing on a former 
garbage dump that had toxic chemicals disposed of in it. The majority of the people who moved 
into that area were poor families who had to deal with the negative health side effects of living 
on this toxic Superfund site. Cancer rates sky rocketed in that neighborhood in old and young 
alike.  
All these problems were emphasized by Hurricane Katrina hitting the city in August 
2005. Around 1,500 people died in New Orleans because of the storm and the poor black 
neighborhoods were the greatest effected. They did not have the means to rebuild or relocate so 
many were forced to live in government trailers for months or even years in some cases. The 
poor engineering of the levees was blamed on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers but the racist 
attitude prevalent in New Orleans was to blame for the disparities of those who were affected by 
Katrina. The black population had less of a chance to survive the storm due to the circumstances 
they were living in. Despite the diverse cultures and melting pot New Orleans has been depicted 
as by most of the United States, there are distinct socio-economic differences in the population 
that are based on race. The majority of New Orleans’ black citizens have not been able to 
overcome this economic gap to escape the poverty they have been forced into.  All the evidence 
above points to the fact that New Orleans municipal, state, and federal governments that have 
control over what happens to the city have failed the majority of its black inhabitants. They have 
failed in protecting them from bodily harm, from impending floods, and from a culture of 
poverty that spread through the poor neighborhoods black neighborhoods. These reasons have 
effectively made the black population of New Orleans into second class citizens. 
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